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Abstract 
 
This research aims at studying the effects of corruption on international migration 
through a gravity model. By using information that covers migration inflows into 20 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries from the 
Institute for Employment Research (IAB) dataset, we examine if corruption is a push and/or 
pull factor for migrants and if this impact varies by skill level and gender. First, we use the 
data for 2010 with a Poisson regression and then we consider the full period (1980-2010) 
with a corresponding fixed effects model. We find that, in accordance with previous 
literature, corruption is a significant push and also a significant pull factor for overall 
migration. The novelty of this finding is that this result is significant in our panel gravity 
model, using not only cross-sectional data but also time-series. Our results also show that 
unlike what the literature predicts, high skilled individuals may not be the most likely to 
migrate, but rather seem to be the less likely group to be affected by corruption. Adding to 
that, we find that the effect of corruption on low skilled migrants may be lessened by their 
inability to migrate. Another finding that is important to highlight is that corruption at the 
origin country affects different skilled individuals in a different way than corruption at 
destination. Finally, we find significant gender differences in the effect of corruption. 
However, if we simply compare overall female and male migration these differences are not 
significant. In fact, these gender differences remain hidden unless we add the extra skill level 
layer of analysis. Our results seem to reflect an extra incentive in origin countries to target 
the female population segment. Furthermore, this discrimination through corruption appears 
to be less significant in destination countries. 
 
JEL-codes: D73; F22; J16; J24; O1 
Key-words: Corruption; International Migration; Gender; Skills; Economic 
Development. 
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Resumo 
 
Neste trabalho estudamos os efeitos da corrupção na migração internacional, através 
de um modelo gravitacional. Usando dados referentes aos imigrantes de 20 países da 
Organização para a Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Económico (OCDE) do Institute for 
Employment Research (IAB), examinamos se a corrupção é um fator de atração/repulsão para 
os migrantes e se o impacto varia por género e nível de competências. Primeiro usamos os 
dados para 2010, através de uma regressão Poisson, em seguida consideramos o período 
completo (1980-2010) através do modelo de efeitos fixos correspondente. Os resultados, tal 
como esperado na literatura, apontam no sentido que a corrupção é um fator significativo 
de atração/repulsão na migração. A novidade desta descoberta é que os resultados são 
significativos para o nosso modelo gravitacional em painel, usando não só dados para 
diferentes países, mas também uma série temporal. Os nossos resultados mostram que, 
contrariamente ao previsto na literatura, os indivíduos com um nível elevado de habilidade 
podem não ser os mais afetados pela corrupção, sendo que parecem ser o grupo menos 
afetado por este fenómeno. Acresce a isto, que o efeito da corrupção nos indivíduos com 
menos competências pode ser diminuído pela sua incapacidade de migrar. Outra conclusão 
importante de sublinhar é que a corrupção no país de origem e de destino afeta de formas 
diferentes indivíduos com níveis de competência diferentes. Finalmente, encontramos 
diferenças significativas do efeito da corrupção entre géneros. Todavia, a simples 
comparação da migração por género não evidencia diferenças significativas. De facto, estas 
diferenças apenas se revelam quando consideramos uma dimensão de análise extra, a do nível 
de competências. Os resultados obtidos parecem refletir um incentivo extra nos países de 
origem para que as mulheres se tornem alvos da corrupção. Para além disso, esta 
descriminação através da corrupção parece ser menos significativa nos países de destino.   
 
 
Códigos-JEL: D73; F22; J16; J24; O1 
Palavras-chave: Corrupção; Migrações Internacionais; Género; Competências; 
Economia do Desenvolvimento. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The study of corruption, through an economic development perspective, is not new. 
As a matter of fact, since the final decade of the previous century, there have been some 
studies dedicated to this topic that laid the theoretical foundations of this phenomenon. For 
example, Mauro (1995) and Shleifer and Vishny (1993) support the existence of a negative 
relationship between corruption and economic growth that was very influential on the debate 
of whether corruption could have positive effects on growth.  
Corruption is a multivariate concept and can be particularly hard to define (Yusuf, 
2012). Beyond the vagueness associated with the inexistence of a clear concept, there seems 
to be some consensus that it involves the inappropriate use of a public power for a private 
gain as in Shleifer and Vishny (1993) or Blackburn and Powell (2011) . Corruption also has 
some peculiar traits that make it a particularly complex subject, namely the imprecision of its 
measurement. In fact, authors such as Al-Marhubi (2000), Swamy et al. (2001) and Aidt (2009) 
point out that perceived corruption indexes may not match effective corruption. This last 
trait is not surprising since one of the main goals of corruption, in most countries, is to pass 
by unnoticed so that it perpetuates itself, either by fear of the law or, at the very least, fear of 
the consequences of being discovered as mentioned by Shleifer and Vishny (1993). Another 
trait of corruption these authors mention is its ability to migrate to alternative activities, that 
is, if there is a focus to eliminate corruption in a certain area, the associated corruption actions 
can move to another area less monitored. Moreover, corrupt individuals and organizations 
are more likely to aim at target sectors less able to defend against or ban such behaviour. 
Tarek and Ahmed (2017), for instance, refer to the shift in public expenditure from sectors 
like education and health and into less transparent sectors such as highway construction. If 
corruption is not tackled and indulgence in corruption does not trigger some punitive 
reaction, other sectors in the economy are also more likely to exhibit corruptive behaviour, 
as Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue. 
The influence of corruption on topics such as economic growth (e.g. Fisman and 
Svensson, 2007), foreign direct investment (e.g. Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2007), inflation (e.g. 
Blackburn and Powell, 2011), or international trade (e.g. Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002) 
has been studied profusely. However, the relation between corruption and migration is still 
significantly unexplored. Yet, corruption tends to worsen individual working and living 
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conditions for population and, therefore, it might influence migration decisions (Dimant et 
al., 2013). 
In the framework of development economics, migration is also a major topic. Firstly, 
due to its raison d’être, underneath these population movements lie deep social and economic 
problems, unsolved to the point that people are forced to restart their lives somewhere else, 
like Ivlevs and King (2017) argue. Secondly, migration strips a country of its human 
resources, which aggravates the poverty trap as workers and entrepreneurs leave the region 
diminishing their human resources, as pointed out by Dimant et al. (2013).  
We thus aim to study the effects of corruption on international migration stocks, 
particularly by using information from the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) dataset 
concerning the period 1980-2010 (5 years intervals) and for 20 OECD destination countries 
by gender, country of origin and educational level. We proceed with a Poisson regression 
(with robust standard errors), inspired by gravity models of migration, for our data 
concerning the year of 2010 and then a fixed effects Poisson regression for the full period 
1980-2010. We aim at answering the following questions: Is corruption a significant push 
and/or pull factor for (overall) migrants? Has corruption different impacts on skilled and 
non-skilled migration? And, is this effect similar between male and female migrants? 
The relevance of this work lies on the profound social and economic implications of 
migration and corruption, as well as the significant gap in the existing literature, which we 
aim to fill. As a matter of fact, and as Yusuf (2012) mentions, corruption is considered the 
second most worrying global issue (1st in 10 developing countries) in a global poll, being 
only behind extreme poverty. The author also mentions the increasing complexity of the 
migration phenomenon, namely on countries from the OECD. At last, the reasons that 
influence migration, especially skilled migration, are worth to study, as it may create a larger 
gap between developed and developing countries (e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2002), Rodrik et al. 
(2004)). 
This dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 discusses main related concepts 
and contributions from the literature, systematizing the major findings on corruption and 
migration research fields. Chapter 3 explains the methodology used and Chapter 4 presents 
valuable insights and results. Conclusions, main limitations and future research paths are 
presented in Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 2. Corruption and migration: main concepts 
2.1 Corruption 
 
In this section, we will focus on presenting the roots of the corruption literature and 
how it has been developed since it emerged, in order to better understand the complexity of 
this problem. At the same time, it is important to know the various definitions and measures 
that have been used and are available in the literature. Therefore, we will present various 
definitions and measures of corruption without forgetting the importance of the relationship 
between them for a successful and thorough analysis. 
 
2.1.1 Corruption: the roots 
As previously mentioned, the study of corruption, through an economic 
development perspective, is not new. Until recently the discussion about corruption, 
although significant, lacked the means through which to measure corruption and explore and 
successfully prove its relationship with e.g., economic growth and development.  
Nevertheless, after the end of the cold war, the world started showing some 
increasing concerns about corruption and first attempts at measuring it appeared. For 
instance, the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International, or the 
control of corruption section of the World Governance Indicators (WGI) by the World Bank 
Group were created halfway through the 1990s (Heywood and Rose, 2013). The 
development of these measures, as well as a growing interest about corruption and the 
increasing international pressure to face this issue, lead to the first empirical works (e.g. 
Mauro, 1995) that dealt with corruption and its effects (Jain, 2001).  
Shortly afterwards many works studied the influence of corruption on topics such as 
economic growth (e.g. Fisman and Svensson, 2007), foreign direct investment (e.g. Bénassy-
Quéré et al., 2007), income inequality (e.g. Gupta et al., 2002), public debt accumulation (e.g. 
Tarek and Ahmed, 2017), inflation (e.g. Blackburn and Powell, 2011), or international trade 
(e.g. Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002), so we can see that corruption has been studied 
profusely. 
An important point that we would like to highlight is that in many of these studies, 
corruption is used to measure institutional quality or governance capability; usually higher 
levels of corruption are linked to weaker institutions and lower governance capability. The 
literature about institutions is responsible for many significant developments and findings 
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about corruption. An example is the review work of Bardhan (1997) on corruption that 
exposes alternative views of corruption: the “grease the wheels” vs. “sand the wheels 
hypothesis”. 
Part of the literature supported the hypothesis that corruption might increase 
countries efficiency, allowing to overcome problems associated with excessive regulations - 
this is known as the “grease the wheels” hypothesis. On the other hand, and since there are 
some flaws to the previous argument, for instance, that officials will start purposely delaying 
the bureaucratic process even more to attract more bribes harming the economy, a different 
branch of the literature emerged called the “sand the wheels” hypothesis.  
Empirical evidence to that point was unable to clarify this issue and one of the 
reasons why was because there wasn’t an indicator to measure corruption. As Jain (2001) 
claims there were some ambiguous conclusions obtained by the usage of imprecise measures 
that would have to be subjected to a re-confirmation as better measures of corruption (and 
governance) arise and develop.  
Some authors, like Aggrey (2012), Heywood and Rose (2013) and Tarek and Ahmed 
(2017), claim there is something like a consensus nowadays or, at least, that most studies 
support that corruption has overall negative effects on economic performance or on specific 
indicators, that is, stand for the “sand the wheels” perspective. Nevertheless, there are still 
few works that argue in favour of the opposing view, or at least partly support it under 
specific circumstances (Tarek and Ahmed, 2017). A very important part of this puzzle is the 
concept used to define corruption that will restrain the measurement used, and so it is 
important to clarify usual concepts and measures of corruption.   
 
2.1.2 Corruption: definitions and measures 
A key concept for our work is corruption, which is a multivariate concept and 
particularly hard to define (Yusuf, 2012). There are many definitions, for instance, Shleifer 
and Vishny (1993) conceive it as government corruption, defined “as the sale by government 
officials of government property for personal gains” (Ibid., p. 599). A different definition is 
given by Blackburn and Powell (2011) “embezzlement of public funds which leads to a loss 
of resources available to the government for financing its expenditures” (Ibid., p. 225). 
Dimant et al. (2013) defines financial corruption, Tarek and Ahmed (2017) focus on public 
corruption and Yusuf (2012) stresses political corruption. Jain (2001) also has a different 
conceptualisation of corruption. The author defines different types of corruption based on 
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the kind of decision that will be influenced by corruption and on what kind of power is held 
by the decision maker: grand corruption, bureaucratic corruption and legislative corruption. 
It is clear, that the definition used changes with the purpose of the research. 
The instrument used to measure this phenomenon also affects the kind of corruption 
a study can deal with. As a matter of fact, corruption has some peculiar traits that make it a 
particularly complex subject, namely the imprecision of its measurement. Jain (2001) also 
highlights that the need to hide these corrupt actions contribute to blurring their actual 
impact. Furthermore, corruption spreads across the economy rather than just confining 
itself. The author claims that if there are opportunities to extract rents, a corrupt regime 
might be unable to eliminate corruption, and is unlikely to commit to doing so. Finally, the 
author supports that corruption motivates agents into making decisions and spend funds in 
channels where collecting bribe is easier; this affects not only quantities spent but also the 
quality of the investments. Transparency and credibility of punishment are important to 
avoid the dangers of corruption. This is in line with what we had already mentioned about 
the literature (e.g. Shleifer and Vishny (1993) and Tarek and Ahmed (2017)) 
So, it is very important to make sure that the kind of corruption we want to measure 
is in accordance with what is being measured. This is a real obstacle that those who want to 
study such question must face. There are different kinds of instruments that can be used but 
not one is without flaws. 
Heywood and Rose (2013) divide these instruments as perception-based 
measurements and non-perceptual approaches. Perception-based measurements such as the 
CPI, The Bribe Payers Index and WGI (the control of corruption dimension) are the most 
widely used. The authors argue that there is a difference between the concept and the 
measurement of corruption, which leads to results that, although reliable, are not necessarily 
valid in the sense that perceptions of corruption may echo a reality but may be related to 
issues other than corruption. For instance, authors such as Al-Marhubi (2000), Swamy et al. 
(2001) and Aidt (2009) point out that perceived corruption indexes may not match effective 
corruption, but even despite highlighting this, sometimes they still have to use these 
instruments. Some other critics include the fact that the relationship between experience of 
corruption and its perception may not be linear, and that it usually responds to absolute levels 
of corruption rather than relative and so, if the level of corruption per person is the same, 
larger countries will tend to have a higher perceived corruption (Heywood and Rose, 2013). 
Another argument Heywood and Rose (2013) mention is that these results, given the 
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attention they get, may allow countries to, even those with high levels of corruption, glorify 
their positive results and dismiss their bad ones, which implies negative consequences for 
the fight against corruption.  
On the other hand, there are the non-perceptual measures. Heywood and Rose 
(2013) name a few existing instruments such as the analysis of physical infrastructure 
compared to existing monetary investment, surveys of direct experience of corruption and 
the rate of criminal convictions of public officials for corruption related crimes. The author 
also mentions the case of electoral fraud in which regressions and mathematic analysis start 
being used, although it is very hard to apply such methods into certain aspects of corruption.  
Heywood and Rose (2013) consider that many of the previous critiques still apply to 
these non-perceptual instruments, namely the difficulties of defining corruption and on how 
these measures can distinguish between different kinds of corruption. Hence, these 
instruments also fail in allowing a significantly better understanding and organization of this 
problem. Furthermore, it may not be possible for the instrument to evaluate the seriousness 
of the act. For instance, an instrument based on the rate of criminal convictions for 
corruption-related crime, does not discriminate between crimes involving high values and 
those with low values. Besides that, the lack of convictions may be itself a symptom of a 
highly corrupt regime and therefore bias this measure. Finally, it may not be possible to scale 
these measures, to allow comparisons since data may be unavailable due to different reasons 
such as the costs of developing such a control or lack of records, especially in some 
developing countries. 
In the present work we will use the CPI by Transparency International. This choice 
is justified in detail in the methodology section. For now, we are focused on presenting the 
roots of the corruption literature, to understand the complexity of this problem. At the same 
time, it is important to know how to use this knowledge in order to find the instrument that 
better fits our goals, and for that we presented various definitions and instruments that have 
been used and are available in the literature. 
In the next section we will describe how previous works studied migration, 
describing the phenomenon and interpreting other databases. We will also present some 
theories about migration under an economic development perspective, so that it is easier to 
establish the relation with corruption, going further and advancing into the works that study 
both variables. 
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2.2 Migration 
 
2.2.1 Migration: concepts and measures 
As previously mentioned, in the framework of development economics, migration is 
also a major topic and one that concerns not only developing but also developed countries 
and that needs international cooperation to be properly dealt with (Docquier et al., 2007). 
Firstly, due to its raison d’être, underneath these population movements lie deep social 
and economic problems, unsolved to the point that people are forced to restart their lives 
somewhere else, like Ivlevs and King (2017) argue. For instance, we can name civil conflicts 
(Issifou, 2017) or lack of enough attainable income in the origin country and even 
unemployment as causes for these movements (Vogler and Rotte, 2000). In this line of 
thought it is also important to distinguish between migrant and refugee.  
According to the United Nations, refugees can be defined as “persons who are outside their 
country of origin for reasons of feared persecution, conflict, generalized violence, or other circumstances that 
have seriously disturbed public order and, as a result, require international protection”, whereas for 
migrants it is stated that although “there is no formal legal definition of an international migrant, most 
experts agree that an international migrant is someone who changes his or her country of usual residence, 
irrespective of the reason for migration or legal status.”.1  
Even though the term refugee is encompassed by the term migrant it is important to 
distinguish between both terms, since danger and life-threatening circumstances are the main 
reason for the migration movement of the refugees and not a voluntary choice. Furthermore, 
they have different legal treatments, for instance, refugees are not penalized for crossing 
borders without permission and are treated under international laws, whereas other kinds of 
migrants are treated under national laws. 
Secondly, for explaining the relevance of the topic, it is crucial to acknowledge that 
migration strips a country of its main human resources (phenomenon usually referred as 
“brain drain”), which aggravates the poverty trap as workers and entrepreneurs leave the 
region, as pointed out by Dimant et al. (2013). However, and despite this being the main 
perspective in the early stage of the related literature, there are also some studies that point 
out a positive effect of migration (“brain gain”) that may compensate the previous maleficent 
effect (e.g. Mountford (1997) and Mariani (2007)).  
                                                        
1http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/definitions, accessed on 12th January 2018. 
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Several studies have been specifically focused on exploring  migration databases, 
namely Docquier et al. (2007), Özden et al. (2011), and the extension Docquier et al. (2009). 
Docquier et al. (2007) use an original data set that classifies international migrants by 
their educational attainment in 1990 and 2000, in order to seek the variables that may be 
driving brain drain (migration of high skilled workers) from developing countries. The 
authors claim the lack of such datasets has kept the brain drain discussion on international 
migrations purely theoretical. Schooling gap and the degree of openness of the sending 
country are therefore the main focus of this article: it seems that a high skilled migration 
suggests either a high schooling gap (usually higher in poorer countries) or a high degree of 
openness (that is affected by country size) but not both at the same time. 
According to the authors, overall there is a stronger skilled migration in countries close 
to the OECD countries and with average levels of schooling that are low (e.g. Small Islands 
of the Pacific and the Caribbean). Proximity also emerges as very important in determining 
skilled migration flows from Central America. Finally, Sub-Saharan African countries 
combine a set of different problems such as low level of development and high political 
instability that promote this kind of migration.  
Although there is an increase in the number of migrations by skilled workers from 
developing countries, emigration rates decreased slightly in this period. This increase 
associated to skills is explained due to a general rise in educational attainment in these 
developing countries. Finally, it is interesting to notice that the share of skilled migrants is, 
in each group, superior to the share of skilled workers among the population (Docquier et 
al., 2007). 
Focusing on the receiving countries, Docquier et al. (2007) also give us some interesting 
insights. In 2000, about two thirds of the total international migration and around sixty 
percent of the skilled immigrants received by OECD countries were from less developed 
countries, which is around fifteen p.p. higher than in 1990. Also, in what concerns the 
recipient countries, in terms of the distribution of migrants into OECD countries, they claim 
about one fifth of these skilled immigrants live in a member state of the European Union 
(EU15) and about three quarters of all migrants live in either Australia, Canada and United 
States. The around five percent skilled migrants left are spread across the other OECD 
countries. 
Özden et al. (2011) cover the period from 1960 to 2000, providing additional insights 
about migration in developing countries. The authors claim that during this period there have 
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been some fundamental changes on the composition of migration, leading to diversified 
migrant stocks. For example, origin countries are now sending migrants to an increasing 
number of destination countries. Furthermore, there has been a concentration of migration 
into developed countries (migration from developing to developed country is the segment 
that has been increasing at a faster pace, on the contrary, migration from developed to 
developing countries has been declining) rather than on developing countries that are rather 
stable in this respect (Özden et al., 2011). 
Docquier et al. (2009) have developed further the gender dimension of international 
migration. According to these authors overall female migration has recently exceeded male 
migration in flows to developed countries due to some determinants such as the rise of the 
female education attainment or an increased demand for women labour. Özden et al. (2011) 
also cover this issue and support the claim that the composition of immigrants’ stocks, in 
terms of gender, has suffered a significant change. 
Docquier et al. (2009) mention other reasons why this gender dimension is important 
to study, for instance women and men may not react with the same intensity to different 
migration factors (push or pull) such as social networks. Furthermore, there are some barriers 
that women unlike men might have to face, namely a discriminating work environment that 
keeps them from reaching their aspirations. This effect may be particularly pronounced in 
developing countries. Finally, female migration may have a different impact on the economy, 
for instance, women have been studied to remit more to the origin country than men. There 
is also an impact at the level of human capital formation due to the brain drain in general, 
aggravated as Docquier et al. (2009) point, since the level of schooling of women is a 
fundamental ingredient for growth. These are some of the motives that made us include a 
gender perspective in our analysis and that further explain the relevance of this issue. 
The creation of these databases has paved the way for more complex studies as the 
lack of information and reliable data didn’t allow for more thorough analyses. As Vogler and 
Rotte (2000) claim, insufficient data had long constrained empirical studies about migration 
flows, especially those from developing countries, so these databases and associated studies 
represented a step further in the investigation and comprehension of migration.  
Based on these databases, there are already studies that link corruption and migration 
(for example, Poprawe (2015) and Ariu and Squicciarini (2013)). However, they only cover 
the previous century and so the period after the year 2007, start of the major financial crisis, 
is not covered at all. In our analysis we use a distinct database which allows us to work with 
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an enlarged time period and this is one of our major contributions to the literature (see 
chapter 3). 
This section served as a way of understanding not only the concepts and measures of 
migration but also the migration patterns that have been pointed out in the discussion of this 
topic. In the next subsection we will present studies that are focused on why individuals 
migrate, more than simply presenting migration movements, and later (section 2.3) we revise 
studies that discuss corruption as a potential determinant of migration. 
 
2.2.2 Models of Migration  
There are many models that, in different ways, discuss the issue of migration. Early 
works such as Mountford (1997) and Vogler and Rotte (2000) provide some valuable 
theoretical insights. More recently Beine et al. (2016) also provide a theoretical framework 
for the study of migration, not only supporting some previous theories, but also taking into 
consideration some new findings made by recent literature. 
Vogler and Rotte (2000) support that there is an inverse u-shape relationship between 
economic development and migration and test the hypothesis that, in early stages of 
development, economic progress might result in more migration even if there is a decrease 
on the gap between the origin and the arrival countries. This happens since a higher level of 
development of the origin country might increase income (or access to funds) or reduce 
certain costs (e.g. information or dislocation costs) and lead to the dissolution of migration 
restrictions (financial or not) and, ceteris paribus, increase migration. 
 Beine et al. (2016) also supports this vision, highlighting the importance of 
considering a loosening of credit constraints (financial restriction) in the migration decision. 
Furthermore, the author also highlights the importance of networks that reduces information 
and uncertainty costs and therefore may also lead to more migration. 
However, at a certain point these effects may be diminished since an increase in the 
development level might reduce differences between countries, lowering migration 
incentives (e.g. income levels become higher). Adding to that, Vogler and Rotte (2000) also 
point that migration incentives may not depend on absolute income but rather on relative 
income. Therefore, if an individual has a low income and is surrounded by other individuals 
in similar economic conditions, there should be an incentive to migrate which is lower than 
if an individual has a low income and is surrounded by relatively richer individuals.   
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The existence of a “home preference” discourages individuals from migrating and also 
leads to lower level of migration than expected (Vogler and Rotte, 2000). Beine et al. (2016) 
suggest that linguistic and cultural proximity between departure and arrival country, for 
instance, reflect this home preference and can be seen as a non-monetary cost of migration, 
having an impact on the ability of individuals to adapting to a different country.  
Mountford (1997) analyses migration, human capital accumulation and income 
distribution and how they interact with each other, considering that uncertainty about the 
success of migration is a key point in the analysis. The author shows that when successful 
migration is not a certainty, in the sense that there might exist a barrier like immigration 
regulations that might prevent the individual from migrating and establishing himself 
successfully, a brain drain can have positive effects on the origin economy, namely by 
increasing equality and average productivity. Furthermore, even a temporary possibility of 
migration may have permanent results on the economy. Note that immigration laws are also 
pointed by Beine et al. (2016) as an important factor with influence on migration.  
Mountford (1997) contradicts the argument that migration contributes to the lingering 
of a poverty trap in developing countries due to brain drain to developed countries (Dimant 
et al., 2013). In fact, since the possibility of migration to a country with higher wages increases 
the expected return of education, there will be an increase in human capital formation which 
can more than compensate the negative effect of a brain drain. An important point is that 
there will be an optimal level of emigration that maximizes these benefits. 
These different theoretical insights allow us to go one step ahead of the mere 
description of migration across countries, enabling a better understanding of individuals, of 
what may drive them into leaving their countries and what may be the possible consequences 
of such a movement. Besides these theoretical considerations, it is also important to study 
this issue empirically to test how well these predictions fit reality. This becomes even more 
important in cases where different predictions point in opposite directions or create 
confounding effects. Empirical works like Mayda (2010) and Grogger and Hanson (2011) 
reached interesting conclusions that connect development issues to migration. 
Mayda (2010) studies the determinants of migrant inflows into 14 OECD countries. 
The author finds that pull factors, namely income opportunities, significantly and positively 
impact the size of the emigration rate in accordance with what we previously mentioned 
when referring to Vogler and Rotte (2000). Also in accordance with Vogler and Rotte (2000), 
distance (that captures the costs of migration) is a significant determinant of emigration rates.  
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However, push factors, like per worker GDP in the origin country, are rarely negative 
and when they are negative the size of the effect is insignificant or smaller than for pull 
factors. This suggests that migration quotas may be more binding than pull effects, increasing 
the importance of migration policies in host countries. In matter of fact, restricted and 
exogenous migration quotas may explain this asymmetry between the push and pull factors 
and, when controlled, that is in the years where immigration policies become less deterring, 
the effects of both pull and push factors become more significant (Mayda, 2010) . 
Grogger and Hanson (2011) create a model of income maximization that makes a 
cause for positive selection of individuals into migration, since more educated individuals are 
more likely to emigrate and positive sorting of migrants across destinations, because migrants 
are more likely to settle in countries with high reward to skill. Migration costs such as 
linguistic and geographic distance between departure and arrival country, migration networks 
and colonial heritage are assumed in the model, so this work is in line with the presented 
literature. Another interesting finding is that post-tax earnings have a stronger correlation 
with migration than pre-tax earnings. Hence, if corruption is like an implied tax for 
individuals (Poprawe, 2015), then it might have a similar result, or even a higher negative 
impact due to its perverse nature. Such relationship needs to be tested in order to better 
understand this phenomenon. The authors also claim that less educated migrants may be 
more likely to end up as refugees, therefore countries that give a higher share of visas to 
refugees, may bias their migration towards less skilled migrants.  
Having discussed the topic of migration through an economic development 
perspective we will now discuss the works that study both corruption and migration and see 
what has already been figured about this complex issue. 
 
2.3 Migration and Corruption 
 
It is important to review the theoretical mechanisms connecting migration and 
corruption. Ariu and Squicciarini (2013), Dimant et al. (2013) and Ahmad and Arjumand 
(2016) pay special attention to skilled migration. Dimant et al. (2013) say that corruption is a 
push factor of migration, particularly for skilled migration. They support their results 
theoretically by claiming that corruption tends to diminish returns to education, damaging 
the better educated, with less pronounced effects and not statistically robust on average 
migration. Corruption at home is then a strong incentive for skilled workers to migrate. 
 
 
13 
 
Ahmad and Arjumand (2016) make an interesting point, considering that corruption 
may drive those who do not want to comply with it to either leave their homelands or drives 
them to become corrupt. The possibility of migration offers skilled and productive human 
capital a higher income returns on their education investment, and that would be preferable 
to have it wasted in rent seeking activities. So, besides corruption shifting resources from the 
productive activities, it may also lead to a significant brain drain. Most importantly, even 
remittances from the emigrants would not have a significant impact on GDP per capita that 
could minimize the harm inflicted.  
Ariu and Squicciarini (2013) argue that highly skilled workers are mobile, flexible and 
have a bigger tendency to migrate. These workers tend to leave corrupt countries and search 
for countries where they gain access to better jobs through skills and merit, and not through 
nepotism or political affiliation. This would increase out-flows of migrants and decrease in-
flows. In their perspective corruption may act more as an obstacle for inflow than a 
motivation for outflow. 
A similar conclusion is reached by Poprawe (2015). The author finds that countries 
with more corruption attract less immigrants and leads to more emigration, but to all workers 
and not only high-skilled ones. Corruption seems to be a push factor for migration even 
when controlling for variables such as distance between countries or GDP per capita. 
Corruption causes more insecurity and seems to worsen economic conditions, and so 
individuals migrate to avoid social and economic costs caused by it. Ketterer and Rodríguez-
Pose (2015) also supports the idea that less corruption is associated with lower levels of 
uncertainty and monetary costs. In their study they conclude that certain factors related to 
regional quality, such as the fight against corruption, attract future residents to certain regions 
in Europe. They argue that the level of corruption in a region has important financial and 
non-financial effects.  
Other works also tackle this issue but in a more peculiar way. Yusuf (2012) argues 
that certain aspects of the migration regimes in the UK, and similar ones in other countries, 
are corruption-friendly in the sense that these countries are the major destination of money 
laundering by politically exposed persons, privileging these individuals instead of skilled 
migrant workers who have had stricter laws, constraining them and limiting their mobility 
and, therefore, also limits the existence of positive externalities in home countries such as 
know-how transfers. Hence, developed countries might be providing opportunities for 
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certain individuals to not only move illicit funds, but also privileging and offering them 
additional benefits.  
Steinberg (2017) shows that natural resource shocks have a positive brain drain effect 
in a country, which is especially relevant in countries that are more susceptible to corruption 
and government inefficiencies. Issifou (2017) also deals with natural resources, showing that 
migration may reduce natural resource rent seeking and decrease civil conflicts. These 
authors claim that migration can be as a way of diminishing rent seeking in an economy and 
through that avoid certain conflicts. This model can be seen as an extension of the model 
provided by Mariani (2007), where rent seeking is broadly defined and can take the form of 
corruption, but also of crime, malfunctioning institutions and other activities similar to 
corruption but that can be linked to it.   
The original model provided by Mariani (2007) presented a mechanism through 
which economies may be influenced by migration. First, the author takes into consideration 
that the economy can be divided in two parts, namely agents can choose to work in the 
productive sector of the economy or in the rent seeking sector. Second, the productive sector 
can be exportable in the sense that they can be used in a different economy (and lead to a 
brain drain), but the rent seeking sector is not. Finally, if we also introduce a possibility of 
migration (into a more secure economy, or in other words with a lower rent-seeking sector), 
then the relative expected return of migration will increase. Also, the proportion of skilled 
workers that choose to join the rent seeking (that may imply corruption) sector shall decrease 
and, therefore, the economy of a country will be better off. This work also supports the 
conclusion by Mountford (1997) that there should be a positive income-maximizing 
migration rate but differs from the former in the sense that sustains that inefficient allocation 
of talent is the reason of underdevelopment (and not low levels of education). These results, 
however, are not robust if we also add endogenous protection: if an individual can use some 
of its income to protect himself, then the possibility of migration does not guarantee the 
previous results.   
Peng (2009) also extends the model provided by Mariani (2007), by using a 
framework of heterogeneous ability rather than the homogenous approach of Mariani (2007). 
Peng (2009) proves that, given the possibility of migration that increases the productive 
sector attractiveness, such will result not only in a quantitative movement to the productive 
sector but also in a qualitative movement since individuals with higher talent will dedicate 
themselves to the productive sector, resulting in a better allocation of talent. In fact, 
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migration increases the comparative payoffs between agents of different productive abilities. 
This result is both complementary and independent to the one by Mariani (2007).2 
In accordance with our research questions, it is also important to highlight the 
segment of the literature that studies the relationship between gender and corruption and 
explain why it can be important for migration. Swamy et al. (2001), Branisa et al. (2013) and 
Jha and Sarangi (2018) are some of the works that tackle this issue.  
Swamy et al. (2001) claim that women are less likely to participate in or condone bribe 
taking and, potentially, they may also be more likely to be driven out their country by 
corruption. This is something we will take into consideration in our analysis (see chapter 4). 
According to the authors, this claim may be sustained by gender differences in access to 
corruption networks since women might be less likely to benefit from corrupt activities as 
they are less likely to be in a position to collect corruption benefits (having lower levels of 
employment or less experience on how to engage in this kind of activities).  
However, Jha and Sarangi (2018) refute the claim that these differences in handling 
corruption are driven by differences in social status and that this relation might change with 
equality of gender (the “corruption convergence in gender” hypothesis) and point that these 
differences will hold even when higher equality is present.  
Furthermore, Branisa et al. (2013) also show that lower equality and representation 
in social institutions are related to higher levels of corruption, since as previously mentioned, 
women might be more averse to corruption and given that they might not have the same 
opportunities to enrol in the decision making process that may be an additional incentive for 
women to “vote with their feet” and migrate.  
It is relevant to highlight that the literature on corruption and migration is very 
recent, still being developed. Even though there are some points that seem to be well 
established in the literature, like the fact that corruption holds a cost for those that migrate, 
there are still many points that must be studied. Gender differences, education, and 
corruption and their impact on migration for instance, are relatively unexplored. In matter 
of fact despite some authors deal with migration and gender (e.g. Docquier et al., 2009) or 
with corruption and gender (for instance, Swamy et al. (2001) and Branisa et al. (2013)), or 
even with migration and education (e.g. Docquier et al., 2007) and corruption and education 
                                                        
2 See appendix 6 for a summary table of the literature of corruption and migration. 
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(e.g. Eicher et al., 2009), to the extent of our knowledge, there is no work that addresses these 
topics simultaneously and that can provide both theoretically and empirical insights.   
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Chapter 3. Methodology  
3.1 Data 
 
In this chapter we will expose the methodology used in this work, focusing on data 
description and the econometric model. We will start with a brief description of our 
dependent variable, providing some justifications for the use of the associated measure. We 
will then do the same for independents variables, with a special highlight on the corruption 
indicator. Furthermore, we will confront our results with other studies to support the 
discussion around expected results. As for the model section, we will discuss gravity models 
and the use of Poisson family models to study migration stocks, both for the year 2010 and 
for a panel dataset.  
 
3.1.1 Dependent variable  
Migration 
Our dependent variable is the migration stocks from the IAB dataset (also known as 
Brücker et al. (2013), although we will not use this designation), an expansion of the one used 
by Docquier et al. (2007). This database has information for the period between 1980 and 
2010, with five years intervals, and carries information about the inflows for 20 OECD 
member states. IAB dataset also has the advantage of disaggregating these flows in terms of 
gender (male or female) and educational attainment namely: Low Skilled (primary education 
or no schooling); Medium Skilled (secondary education); High Skilled (post-secondary 
education).  
This disaggregation allows us to explore additional possibilities than those already 
explored in the literature, namely analyse if there are any significant gender differences in 
migration. At the same time, we can explore questions that have been debated in the literature 
namely if corruption has different impacts on differently skilled migrants, where in this case, 
according to the database we are using, skill level is defined by educational attainment.  
There is a correspondence between these flows into OECD destination countries and 
symmetric outflows from 195 origin countries, even though we will only use those that also 
appear in the “Gravity” database by the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales 
(CEPII), that is, we exclude the data from Monaco, Holy See and Liechtenstein, using 192 
different origin countries. We also exclude the migrants with origin “Unknown”. By the 
combination of origin and destination countries we have information on flows for 3820 
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different country pairs, that will be the “unit” of our analysis, as it is for the case of Poprawe 
(2015) in a similar study.   
In this dataset the definition of migrant relies on the concept of foreign-born rather 
than of citizenship, although it uses the latter when the first is not available. One reason for 
this is that country of birth cannot be changed, while in the citizenship case it can vary not 
only over time, but also from country to country which is not ideal for a time-series and 
cross-country analysis.  
Another important detail is that the definition of migrant also implies individuals with 
age over 25 years old, in our case this decision is helpful since it allows comparisons with 
other international migration databases. This criterion also helps excluding individuals who 
are temporarily studying abroad or that haven’t finished their education yet. 
Finally, we will use this database for two reasons: first, information obtained in these 
OECD countries is more reliable than that provided in many destination countries, namely 
in some developed countries that compose our dataset (Özden et al., 2011). Second, and as 
previously stated, these countries receive a large part of all international migrants and 
therefore the size of this database is considerable and relevant for our study (Docquier et al., 
2007).  
 
3.1.2 Independent variables 
In order to explain the dependent variable, that is the migration stocks, we must take 
into consideration different variables that have already been used in the literature and see 
how they behave in our model. These variables can provide answers to the questions we 
propose to answer so it is important to see how we expect them to perform under our study 
before we present our results, confronting them with previously established theories. 
 
Corruption 
Corruption is the main independent variable in this work, and the one we build our 
study around. As for the corruption indicator, considering all the above reasoning about the 
difficulties of defining and accordingly using a specific instrument to measure it, we must 
account for some additional limitations.  
For instance, the period and countries covered by our data (the period between 1980 
and 2010) have proven to be an obstacle, since both migration and corruption have a limited 
number of databases and reliable sources. However, in the case of corruption instruments 
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like this are even more restricted with relatively small time series and a low reach especially 
within developing countries. Another difficulty arises in knowing what kind of measures 
should be used since the research question is focused on migrants, being hard to say whether 
perception or experience of corruption has a bigger weight in migration decisions: first the 
decision to leave and, then, the decision of where to migrate (if there is such a possibility). 
In this work we will use the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) from Transparency 
International, averaging it for the five-year period. In the cases where this was not possible, 
namely in the period between 1980 and 1995 we used the estimation of Transparency 
International that was closest to that date. For 1980 and 1985 we used its estimation for 
1980-1985, for 1990 we used the estimation for the 1988-1992 period and for 1995 the 
estimation for 1993-1996. These estimations have been published in 1996 and expand on the 
time series but also enlarge the country base of the CPI. 
Corruption, according to Transparency International, is defined as “the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain. It can be classified as grand, petty and political, depending 
on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs”. 3 The reasons for choosing 
CPI are: it measures corruption at a national level; it is widely used in the literature (despite 
the previously mentioned flaws), for instance in Poprawe (2015) and Ahmad and Arjumand 
(2016); its definition of corruption is close to many works such as Shleifer and Vishny (1993); 
it is available for a large time period (covering our migration data) and has a wide number of 
countries listed, that increased from 54 in 1980 to 178 in 2010. We will use as independent 
variables the CPI score for both the origin and the destination country like in Poprawe 
(2015), but we will also do some tests with the squared CPI score of the origin and destination 
countries to see if our results improve. This check for an improvement in the specification 
has been used in corruption literature about corruption, for instance in Aidt (2009). The CPI 
for the period covered (it suffered alterations after 2010) can go from 0 to 10 (continuous 
and not discrete), where a higher value corresponds to a lower perception of corruption. For 
instance, a change from 5 to 6 implies a reduction in the perceived levels of corruption.  
We expect that higher corruption will lead to more migration outflows and lower 
migration inflows as we described on the literature review (for example, Poprawe (2015) and 
Ariu and Squicciarini (2013)). 
 
                                                        
3 https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption#define, accessed on 12th January 2018. 
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Control Variables 
Unemployment rate: The unemployment rate (as a percentage of total labour 
force), also averaged for each five-year period, is from World Development Indicators. This 
is an important variable for our study in particular, and for the migration literature in general. 
White and Buehler (2018), Maria Davidescu et al. (2017) and Mayda (2010) are some examples 
of works that have used this variable to explain migration. Beine et al. (2016) suggest the use 
of this indicator in (gravity) models to study migration since an increase in the unemployment 
rate may decrease a destination country’s ability to attract migrants. This effect may be 
mitigated by the presence of unemployment benefits in the destination countries. Vogler and 
Rotte (2000) reach a similar conclusion adding that due to the lack of existence of guarantees 
that migration will be successful, we can also see the unemployment as connected to the 
uncertainty of achieving a successful migration. 
On the other hand, the level of unemployment in the origin country should have the 
opposite effect, lack of employment (or uncertainty of employment) may lead individuals to 
migrate in order to attain some income. Vogler and Rotte (2000) also highlight the role of 
the diversification of labour markets by the migration of some family members as a way of 
decreasing the dependence of the family on the labour market of the origin country. This 
effect is mitigated by the existence of benefits to the unemployed in the origin country. 
So, for this indicator we expect that the higher the unemployment rate of the origin 
country the higher the migration stocks, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, a lower 
unemployment rate of the destination country should lead to higher migration stocks. 
Taxes: Tax revenues (% of GDP) are gathered from World Development Indicators. 
We will use this indicator averaged for the five-year period that composes our data. Grogger 
and Hanson (2011) and Poprawe (2015) have also used an indicator to take into account the 
effect of taxes on migration 
The rationale behind the use of this instrument is that income is one of the most 
important determinants for migration. Thus, if the choice is between two different countries 
with similar characteristics to an individual, choosing the one with the lower taxes (higher 
available income) is the most obvious choice, although we are aware that this may not be the 
best indicator to measure this variable. Nevertheless, we use this indicator since it covers a 
longer period of time (although for some countries the time-series is shorter) and has a wider 
scale of countries, being broader than other databases used to measure taxation level. 
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We expect that as taxation level in the destination country increases (decrease in the 
origin country) there will be a decrease in migration, ceteris paribus. However, this effect may 
be changed since high taxes level also implies some social security. Namely many of the 
destination countries have some kind of social income that they provide to their citizens. 
Inflation: We use a five-year averaged inflation rate, measured by the consumer price 
index (annual %) from the World Development Indicators. We use the five-year averaged 
inflation ration. Inflation serves as a measure of macroeconomic instability and, at the same 
time, it also influences the real income of individuals, inducing their preferences to migrate. 
According to the literature we expect that more inflation will lead to less migration (Poprawe, 
2015) in both the destination (mostly due to macroeconomic instability) and origin countries 
(loss of real income). 
 
The CEPII provides a few databases that have been widely used by many studies in 
the trade literature (e.g. Burger et al., 2009). Recently many studies in migration have also used 
the variables from their databases (e.g. Poprawe, 2015). 
From the Gravity and Geo CEPII databases we use: 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita (current US $): We use the five-year 
averaged natural logarithm of the GDP per capita in both the destination and origin country. 
According to the literature, a higher GDP per capita is expected to reflect a higher income 
at a given country, so we expect that there are more inward migrants and less outward 
migrants at countries with a higher income (Beine et al., 2016). This effect may be lessened 
by the existence of credit constraints or by the existence of significant costs caused by home 
preferences leading to positive coefficients for the GPD per capita at the home country 
(Poprawe, 2015). 
Population: We used the five-year averaged natural logarithm of the total population 
(in millions) in both the destination and origin country. This indicator is the mass variable of 
our gravity model and an increase in the population of either destination or origin country 
will lead to an increase in migration (Poprawe, 2015). 
 Contiguity: A dummy variable, with value 1 if both countries are contiguous and 0 
otherwise. In other words, this variable assumes the value 1 if destination and origin country 
share a common border. Migration should be higher (Poprawe, 2015) if both countries are 
contiguous as it reflects proximity (both physical and cultural), however it has also appeared 
as non-significant in some other studies Mayda (2010). 
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 Common (official primary) language: A dummy variable, with value 1 if both 
countries have the same official primary language and 0 if they do not. According to the 
literature (Beine et al., 2016) if countries share the same official primary language then, ceteris 
paribus, migration stocks should be higher. Not knowing the language may prove to be a hard 
barrier to overcome and that may be a deterrent to migration. 
 Common religion: This variable varies between 0 and 1. If countries share the same 
religion with no fractionalization then this variable will equal 1, if there is no common 
religion despite fractionalization then this will equal 0. Sharing a common religion should 
increase migration, ceteris paribus, reflecting cultural proximity (Beine et al., 2016). However, 
due to the homogeneity that exists in destination countries this result might be biased so we 
should be careful when using it. 
Distance (population weighted per kilometre): The weighted distance is based 
on bilateral distances between the major cities of those two countries, with inter-city 
distances being weighted by the percentage of the city in the overall country’s population, 
according to the formula: 
dij=(∑ (𝑘∈ⅈ popk/popi) ∑ (𝑙∈𝑗 popl/popj)d𝑘𝑙
θ )1/𝜃   (3.1) 
where popk is the population of agglomeration k belonging to country i, and θ measures the 
sensitivity of migration to bilateral distance dkl. In this case, θ is set equal to -1 and it has the 
property of constant elasticity of substitution.4 
We use the natural logarithm of this distance between both countries. According to 
the literature as the distance increases, migration between two countries should decrease, 
ceteris paribus, reflecting increased migration costs (Vogler and Rotte, 2000).  
 
3.1.3 Summary statistics 
Table 1 presents some summary statistics for our database (for 2010). We can see 
that for our dependent variables there is a very high standard deviation, even above the mean 
values. In our sample, for the year 2010, we can see that there are more female migrants 
abroad than male migrants, with the only exception being the medium skilled segment. As 
for skill level, high skilled migrants are the segment that represents the most individuals. The 
dummy variables show the percentage of the country pairs with a given attribute, for example 
                                                        
4 We also experimented our model with the distance variable where the θ value takes the value of 1, but since 
the overall results do not change much we chose θ=-1 because it is the usual coefficient the literature uses and 
because of the additional CES property. 
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less than three per cent of our country pairs have a colonial relationship between the 
departure and arrival country. Another important point is that for variables like corruption, 
inflation and other economic variables, the mean for the destination countries presents a 
better environment for the destination countries than for origin countries. 
 
Table 1- Summary statistics 
Variable Country Pairs Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Overall_Migrants 3820 19163.81 167997.1 0 9234340 
Low Skill_Migrants 3820 6095.184 89812.95 0 5292107 
Medium Skill_Migrants 3820 5422.156 48003.84 0 2626342 
High Skill_Migrants 3820 7646.473 46142.5 0 1315891 
Male_Migrants 3820 9490.752 89702.61 0 5044610 
Male_Low Skill_Migrants 3820 2982.869 48779.89 0 2900516 
Male_Medium Skill_Migrants 3820 2792.36 26401.36 0 1468257 
Male_High Skill_Migrants 3820 3715.523 22655.19 0 675837 
Female_ Migrants 3820 9673.06 78923.64 0 4189730 
Female_Low Skill_Migrants 3820 3112.315 41158.97 0 2391591 
Female_Medium Skill_Migrants 3820 2629.795 21976.12 0 1158085 
Female_High Skill_Migrants 3820 3930.95 23861.66 0 672968 
CPI_Destination 3820 7.965 1.274 4.2 9.4 
CPI_Origin 3580 4 2.062 1.15 9.4 
Colonial_Relationship 3820 0.026 0.159 0 1 
Common_Language 3820 0.142 0.349 0 1 
Common_Religion 3780 0.183 0.238 0 0.969 
Contiguity 3820 0.015 0.12 0 1 
Distance 3800 8.662 0.836 4.952 9.88 
GDPPC_Destination 3820 10.666 0.467 9.273 11.527 
GDPPC_Origin 3720 8.358 1.542 5.218 11.527 
Inflation_Destination 3820 2.116 0.665 0.887 3.6 
Inflation_Origin 3540 54.193 637 -0.077 8503.581 
Unemp_Destination 3820 6.688 2.31 3.25 12.467 
Unemp_Origin 3120 8.678 6.641 0.3 35.5 
Pop_Destination 3820 2.637 1.368 -0.715 5.717 
Pop_Origin 3800 1.705 2.154 -4.627 7.189 
Tax_Destination 3629 21.007 6.729 9.639 33.259 
Tax_Origin 2821 17.278 7.438 1.217 48.838 
Source: Own computation. 
 
There are other characteristics of migration that are also reflected in our data. For 
instance, in Table 2 we can see that origin countries are now sending migrants to an 
increasing number of destination countries as Özden et al. (2011) claimed, and that this trend 
is transversal for female and male migrants. Given our objectives we will not analyse this in 
excessive detail, even though we could do a more thorough description of these 
characteristics. 
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Table 2- Migration stocks between countries 
Year Total Migrants Female Migrants 
Country Pairs with 0 flows % of Country Pairs with 0 flows Country Pairs with 0 flows % of Country Pairs with 0 flows 
1980 1749 45.79 1881 49.24 
1985 1178 30.84 1319 34.53 
1990 1025 26.83 1195 31.28 
1995 708 18.53 888 23.25 
2000 574 15.03 738 19.32 
2005 526 13.77 684 17.91 
2010 509 13.32 658 17.23 
Source: Own computation 
 
After introducing the variables, we will now present the correlation matrix in order 
to have a first view of the interaction between each pair of variables and to verify if there is 
any irregularity or strong correlation we should be careful about in our model (Table 3).  
According to our results, we have relatively small correlation values between our 
dependent and independent variables. As for CPI scores the correlation is always below 0.05, 
with a positive sign for the CPI of the origin with most of the independent variables and a 
negative one for the CPI of the destination country.  
As for the correlation between independent variables, there are some cases that 
require our attention. The first one is the very high correlation coefficient between GDP per 
capita and the CPI score of the origin country that is over 0.81. However, since this variable 
is very important for our model we cannot simply overlook it and furthermore this 
relationship does not go against what we expected. In fact, on one hand high per capita 
income countries such as Sweden, Denmark and others present low levels of perceived 
corruption and, on the other hand, lower income economies like Niger or Cambodia present 
high levels of perceived corruption. Other high correlation coefficients are the ones between 
the CPI score and the unemployment rate of the destination country (0.67), and GDP per 
capita and the unemployment rate of the destination country (0.61). Again, these results are 
not surprising given the close link between employment and GDP per capita. Furthermore, 
this proximity may be strengthened due to the small amount of observations.  
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Table 3 – Correlation Matrix 
 
 
  Overall CPI CPI Colonial  Common Common Contiguity Distance GDPPC GDPPC Inflation Inflation Unemp. Unemp. Pop.  Pop. Tax. Tax. 
  Migrants Destination Origin Relationship Language Religion     Destination Origin Destination Origin Destination Origin Destination Origin Destination Origin 
Overall  
1.000                                   
Migrants 
CPI 
-0.033 1.000                                 
Destination 
CPI 
0.001 -0.005 1.000                               
Origin 
Colonial  0.057 -0.039 -0.038 
1.000                             
Relationship *** * * 
Common 0.065 0.056 0.060 0.263 
1.000                           
Language *** *** *** *** 
Common 
0.010 
-0.040 0.183 -0.045 0.130 
1.000                         
Religion * *** ** *** 
Contiguity 
0.181 
-0.017 
0.153 
-0.022 
0.160 0.169 
1.000                       
*** *** *** *** 
Distance 
-0.051 0.072 -0.224 
0.010 
0.049 -0.096 -0.382 
1.000                     
** *** *** ** *** *** 
GDPPC  
0.004 
0.499 
-0.003 -0.016 0.004 -0.025 0.010 
-0.198 
1.000                   
Destination *** *** 
GDPPC  
0.030 -0.001 
0.814 -0.063 
-0.020 
0.203 0.172 -0.318 
-0.003 1.000                 
Origin *** *** *** *** *** 
Inflation  
0.006 
-0.336 
0.002 
0.042 
0.028 
-0.125 -0.043 0.244 -0.531 
0.001 1.000               
Destination *** ** *** ** *** *** 
Inflation  
-0.032 0.000 
-0.537 
0.021 -0.004 
-0.142 -0.123 0.203 
0.001 
-0.543 
-0.001 1.000             
Origin *** *** *** *** *** 
Unemp  0.015 -0.671 0.003 0.001 -0.049 0.079 0.014 -0.051 -0.610 0.002 0.140 -0.000 
1.000           
Destination   ***     ** ***   ** ***   ***   
Unemp  
-0.030 0.002 
-0.122 
0.004 
0.057 
0.012 -0.019 
-0.047 
0.002 
-0.097 
-0.000 
0.066 
-0.003 1.000         
Origin *** *** ** *** *** 
Pop 0.171 -0.304 
0.002 
0.143 0.091 -0.047 
0.019 
0.085 -0.340 
0.001 
0.039 
-0.000 
0.415 
-0.001 1.000       
Destination *** *** *** *** ** *** *** * *** 
Pop  0.111 
0.002 
-0.185 -0.053 -0.074 -0.159 0.058 
0.010 0.002 
-0.132 
-0.000 0.016 -0.003 
-0.169 
-0.006 1.000     
Origin *** *** ** *** *** *** *** *** 
Tax  -0.123 0.314 
-0.002 
0.062 -0.088 -0.089 -0.037 
-0.021 
0.178 
-0.000 
0.225 
-0.000 
-0.411 
0.001 
-0.561 
0.003 1.000   
Destination *** *** *** *** *** * *** *** *** *** 
Tax  
-0.024 -0.002 
0.311 
0.024 
0.102 0.088 
0.027 
-0.140 
-0.001 
0.294 
-0.002 
-0.176 
0.003 
0.280 
0.004 
-0.352 
-0.007 1.000 
Origin *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 
Note: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Source: Own computation. 
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3.2 The model 
 
3.2.1 Gravity models 
As we already stated, in this work we take influence from the Gravity models that 
are usually used in the international trade literature (e.g. Burger et al., 2009) but that have 
recently been adopted in works about migration (e.g. Beine et al., 2016), even though there 
has been an ongoing discussion on the specification of these models as we will show.  
Gravity Models rely on Newton’s law of universal gravitation. Accordingly, the 
gravitational attraction between two countries is proportional to the product of the masses 
of the countries, usually the Gross Domestic Product (common in trade related studies) or 
the size of the Population (common in migration studies), and inversely proportional to the 
geographical distance as presented by Burger et al. (2009) in a basic model: 
Iij=K
M
i
β1M
j
β2
𝑑
ij
β3
     (3.1) 
where Iij is the interaction intensity of our dependent variable, so in our case that would be 
migration stocks from one country to another, M is the mass of the countries measured by 
its population, dij is the distance between two country and betas are parameters to measure 
the strength of these effects. The model can be easily adapted in order to have variables such 
as common language or past colonial relationship, or even the CPI score for both origin and 
destination country.  
In earlier stages of the literature, this model was usually formalized through a log-
normal specification. This specification however has a couple of disadvantages that started 
being pointed out in the literature (e.g. Burger et al., 2009)., such as the bias that is generated 
through the logarithmic transformation; the assumption that all error terms have equal 
variance (homoskedasticity) that did not hold and which puts in cause the efficiency and 
consistency of the model (Beine et al., 2016);  the sensitivity of the model to zero valued 
flows is also a significant limitation of this specification since there is no way of properly 
dealing with this flaw in a log-normal scenario as either dropping the zeros or giving these 
zeros a value of 1 leads to inconsistent estimators (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). Finally, 
an ordinary least squares (OLS) model also has the shortcoming of being able to predict 
negative events when they should take the value of 0 or above (Wooldridge, 2010). 
Given these fragilities researchers have turned into different models to find a way of 
solving this dilemma. The literature has turned into models from the Poisson family, for 
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instance Poprawe (2015) uses a negative binomial model and does a robustness check with 
a Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) model. Other examples include the zero 
inflated variations of the Poisson and negative binomial models such as the one used by 
White and Buehler (2018). 
 The Poisson family models are usually used to model count data, that is a model 
where the dependent variable is a discrete non-negative integer (Hilbe, 2014). In the case of 
migrations, the number of people that migrate (in our definition foreign born individuals, 
for most cases) is clearly such a dependent variable.  
 According to Greene (2011), the primary equation of the model is: 
Prob (Y= yi | xi) = 
ⅇ−λiλ1
𝑦𝑖
𝑦𝑖!
⋅, yi = 0, 1, 2, ...    (3.2) 
where: 
λi =  ⅇ
𝒙𝒊
′𝜷      (3.3) 
or in an equivalent way (although we will work with the previous functional form):   
ln(λ
i
) =  𝒙𝒊
′𝜷      (3.4) 
Additionally, the Poisson model has the restrictions: 
E [yi | xi] = λi =  ⅇ
𝒙𝒊
′𝜷    (3.5) 
Var [yi | xi] = λi =  ⅇ
𝒙𝒊
′𝜷    (3.6) 
and therefore:  
E [yi | xi] = Var [yi | xi] = λi = ⅇ
𝒙𝒊
′𝜷  (3.7) 
and then the model is solved by a maximum likelihood estimation as shown for instance in 
Cameron and Trivedi (2009).  
The restriction imposed in (3.5) is also known as the Poisson variance assumption 
and if it holds then the data is equidispersed, however this assumption does not usually hold. 
In our case our dependent variables are clearly overdispersed, in fact a simple alpha test 
(through a likelihood ratio test of the Poisson model vs. the “negative binomial 2” (NB2) 
model) asserting that the probability that we would observe these data conditional on 𝛼=0 
is virtually zero, favouring the overdispersion hypothesis ( 𝛼 > 0)  and clearly rejecting 
equidispersion in all the sub-samples (by skill and by gender) of our sample.5  
 In order to effectively deal with overdispersion there are a couple of different 
adaptations to the model that we make, and that have been made in the literature.  
                                                        
5 We provide the alpha values that we found in the table of the NB2 regression in appendix 2 (and 3).  
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 The first alternative involves the use of Poisson with robust standard errors as 
suggested by Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), that is the estimation is made by pseudo-
maximum-likelihood (or quasi-maximum-likelihood). These authors and others such as 
Cameron and Trivedi (2009) claim that this method provides consistent estimates even if the 
count is not actually Poisson distributed. Furthermore, it is consistent even if the dependent 
variable is not a count and that is the reason why it can be used to predict, for example, the 
volume of exports in trade literature.  
The PPML unlike the regular Poisson model only requires that the conditional mean 
function specified in equation (3.5) and does not require the equation (3.6) to hold to 
maintain relative efficiency as is discussed in Wooldridge (2010). This author claims that, due 
to its robustness, this alternative has an advantage over some other alternatives such as the 
“Negative Binomial 1” (NB1) model where the variance assumption is relaxed to (according 
to Hilbe (2014)): 
Var [yi | xi] = λi(1 + 𝛼)    (3.8) 
If we wanted to estimate conditional probabilities then a different model such as 
NB2, where the variance assumption is relaxed to (according to Hilbe (2014)):  
Var [yi | xi] = λi(1 + 𝛼λi)    (3.9) 
might also provide a more flexible alternative, however we are more interested in finding the 
effects of our independent variables on migration and not as much in finding the probability 
of having a specific number of migrants (and therefore we did not specify any density 
function for the negative binomial models in this section), so the PPML model seems to be 
a good fit. 
 
3.2.2 Panel data models 
  After estimating the PPML model for 2010, we will then use the full dataset, 
including information for the period 1980-2010 (although the benefit of additional 
information is diminished by the lack of data on CPI for some countries). 
For this, we will use a two-way (time and country pair) fixed effects Poisson model 
as specified by Fernández-Val and Weidner (2016): 
E [yit | xit] =λit =  ⅇ
𝒙𝒊𝒕
′ 𝜷 + 𝛿𝑡 +𝜃𝑖    (3.10) 
where we add the term 𝛿𝑡 to account for time-fixed fixed effects and 𝜃ⅈ  to account for 
country pair fixed effects. Notice that the inclusion of country pair fixed effects allows for 
 
 
29 
 
the model to account for multilateral resistance to migration, that is some disturbance in 
migration caused by the existence of alternative and attractive destinations (Beine et al., 2016).   
 The fixed effects Poisson Regression (with cluster-robust standard errors), similarly 
to PPML, is able to consistently estimate the conditional mean parameters and therefore fits 
to our purposes. As shown in Wooldridge (1999) (and also in Wooldridge, 2010), this model 
is completely robust to distributional misspecification and serial correlation. Notice that the 
random effects model, unlike the fixed effects model, has no known robustness properties 
and therefore would need the Poisson distribution assumption, serial independence and 
some other assumptions to hold. For instance, the fixed effects model, unlike the random 
effects, allows for unrestricted heterogeneity across individuals. Since we believe that this 
heterogeneity may have a significant influence on our results, country pairs fixed effect 
cannot be neglected as stated by Baltagi et al. (2014). Therefore, a random effects model does 
not provide any additional useful advantages when compared to the fixed effects model. 
Furthermore, a Hausman test would not be useful to decide between these two models since 
we are using robust standard errors,6 like it is to decide between for the negative binomial 
fixed effects model (NBFE), that is chosen vs. its random effects counterpart. Last but not 
least, in the literature there is a clear preference for fixed effects over random effects models 
(e.g. Poprawe, 2015) 
 The negative binomial fixed effects model on the other hand is also not a solution to 
this problem and has been contested in the literature. For instance, Allison and Waterman 
(2002) show that this is not a true fixed effects estimator, as with this model it is possible to 
calculate estimates for time invariant variables, and so the authors suggest using different 
approaches. This happens since, as the authors claim, the model is based on a regression 
decomposition of the overdispersion parameter rather than a decomposition of the mean. 
 Guimarães (2008) suggests a test to see if the NBFE can be appropriate despite the 
previous arguments, but we cannot use it since for this test it is recommended at least 20 
time periods for 1000 individuals. So, our data does not fit the requirements to perform this 
test and therefore we will not use this model.  
                                                        
6 If we were not using robust standard errors, the results would point to fixed-effects, but this is meaningless 
given the assumption failures, so we will not present this test. 
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Chapter 4. The influence of corruption on migration stocks: an empirical 
assessment  
 
In this chapter we implement an econometric procedure in order to analyse the 
impact of corruption on migration stocks, after controlling for other determinants of 
migration. We will start by implementing the Poisson model with robust standard effects 
(PPML) for 2010. We will then check our results against the fixed effects version of the 
Poisson model that also works as a robustness test in other similar works (Poprawe, 2015). 
In this model we will use both time and country pair fixed effects and that will allow us to 
have a better understanding of how corruption affects migration.   
It is important to highlight that in these two models we will differentiate 12 different 
sub-samples according to three layers. The first one is overall migration and corresponds to 
the full dataset. This layer has been studied in most studies of this type, e.g. Poprawe (2015). 
The second layer is the differentiation according to the skill level, that is, high, medium and 
low skill migration subsamples. Usually only high skilled migration is studied, for example 
Dimant et al. (2013). The third layer allows us to differentiate these four subsamples (overall 
and high, medium and low skilled) by gender (male and female). This layer has not been 
studied in any other work as far as we know.  
Notice there are other possible models in the literature that could also be used for 
the purpose of a robustness check (Negative Binomial, Zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP)) and 
Burger et al. (2009) suggest that these different specifications should all be presented. We will 
present these alternative models regressions in appendix. 
 
4.1. Poisson regression with robust standard errors (PPML) 
Starting with the Poisson regression with robust standard errors for 2010 that is 
Table 6 (and 7 presents the same information but through incidence rate ratios), we can see 
that in all regressions the pseudo R-squared is fairly high varying between 0.65 and 0.80, 
indicating a good fit for our model (Dimant et al. (2013). R-squared is less than 0.30, and 
even though these two cannot be compared it can still be used as a reference. In addition, 
our results suggest that our variables are better at explaining migration for the high skilled. 
The Wald test also does not seem to point to some kind of trouble.  
Furthermore, we can see that overall (for all migrants) the results point in the same 
direction predicted by the literature. The interpretation of the coefficients is as follows: a one 
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point change in the CPI score of origin will lead to an expected increase of migration by a 
factor of (e0.233) 1.262. In fact, the CPI (Corruption Perception Index) scores of the origin 
and destination countries are significant for the migration movement, in the sense that 
considering all migrants the effect of the CPI score of the origin country has a significant 
negative impact on overall migration stocks, and that the CPI score of the destination 
country has a significant positive coefficient.  
It is important to remember that a higher CPI score corresponds to a country with 
less perceived corruption and that a lower score corresponds to higher perceived corruption 
in a certain country. Therefore, according to our results, origin countries with higher 
perceived corruption, ceteris paribus, tend to have a higher number of migrants reflecting a 
push effect caused by corruption. This result is in accordance with Ahmad and Arjumand 
(2016) and their claim that corruption may drive those who do not want to comply with it 
to leave their homelands.  
On the other hand, destinations countries with a lower perceived corruption are 
more attractive to migrants. This pull effect can be explained by the view that less corruption 
is associated with lower levels of uncertainty and smaller monetary costs associated with 
corruption (Ketterer and Rodríguez-Pose, 2015). These arrival countries thus provide better 
conditions than their higher corruption counterparts for migrants that, ceteris paribus, will 
rather migrate into these countries with lower levels of corruption.  
These results can be compared with the results previously stated in the literature. 
There is a slight disagreement in the literature since, for instance, Ariu and Squicciarini (2013) 
suggest that corruption acts more as a deterrent for inflows than as a catalyser for outflows. 
While on the other hand, Poprawe (2015) finds that the effect of corruption in the origin 
country (push effect) is stronger than the pull effect of the (lack of) perceived corruption in 
the destination. 
We find that even though the CPI score of the destination country has a higher 
absolute value for overall migration, validating that the pull effect of the arrival country is 
stronger than the push of the home country although not by much, it is still less significant 
than the CPI score of the origin country. So, our results do not fully support either side.  
Notice however that compared to these studies we have a rather homogenous and 
small set of destination countries with low perceived corruption levels that may be 
diminishing the effect of the CPI score on the destination country. 
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Our results are similar to the above empirical works and to the study by Dimant et 
al. (2013) that found that higher levels of corruption in the origin country lead to more 
outward migration and less inward migration, also matching theoretical models such as the 
one presented by Mariani (2007). So, there is some consensus in the literature that more 
corruption leads to less attractive conditions for individuals even though there is a discussion 
on the scale of these effects and on which one is stronger.   
An extra layer of analysis allows us to differentiate this effect by skill level. We find 
that the push effect of the CPI score of the origin country is stronger for migrants with lower 
skill level in a seemingly linear relationship, that is the lower the skill level the stronger will 
be the push effect reflected on migration.7 This goes against Dimant et al. (2013) result that 
the negative effect of corruption is stronger for higher skilled migrants, since they have made 
a higher investment in their skill level and want to retrieve their investment. It seems that 
higher levels of skill are able to handle corruption better than lower levels, it could be that 
higher skilled workers can either be more efficient at protecting themselves or their 
possessions (e.g. by using part of their income as suggested by Mariani (2007)). Higher skilled 
individuals may also have an easier access to corruption networks, lessening their losses or 
even providing them some rents (Swamy et al., 2001) since corruption, as defined by the CPI, 
implies taking advantage of a position of power and it is reasonable to assume that higher 
skilled workers have better chances to have such jobs. Even if we assume that all skill levels 
are equally likely to have such a position of power, incentives to become corrupt may be 
different since, for instance, if the punishment for being found using a certain position to 
obtain gains is being fired, it would be easier for the high skilled individual to find a 
replacement job and so, ceteris paribus, he/she would also be more likely to try to engage in 
such activities.    
If we go even further it is possible to assume that better connected individuals have 
a stronger chance of becoming high skilled than other individuals, taking advantage of their 
favourable position in a way similar to what is described by Yusuf (2012).  
However, it is possible to reconcile our results with Dimant et al. (2013), since the 
CPI score of the destination country has a significant effect on high skilled migrants, and 
both effects combined seem to generate a stronger overall effect on high skilled migrants, so 
there is still a strong incentive for these individuals to migrate since, despite the previous 
                                                        
7 See Table 4 for skill related differences in coefficients. 
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reasoning, other countries may still be able to provide better opportunities for these 
individuals. Unlike what happens for the high skilled migrants, where the effect of the 
country of arrival is stronger than that for the home country, for medium skill migrants these 
two effects have similar strength. Low skilled migrants do not seem to be affected by the 
CPI score of the destination country, so the strength of the effects of the CPI score of the 
home country by skill is opposite to the one of the destination country, that is the effect of 
the CPI score of the destination country is stronger for migrants with a high skill level and 
for the origin country the effect is stronger for lower skilled migrants.  
If we also differentiate between genders, we can see that both genders present similar 
effects of corruption (in both destination and origin) for migration (without discriminating 
by skill level).8 However, the same does not happen when we do discriminate the results by 
gender and skill. When it comes to high skilled migrants there is significantly higher 
coefficients for female migrants for the CPI score of the destination and for the origin CPI 
score of the destination country. It appears that for high skilled female migrants there might 
be an additional need to prevent against corruption and they might be more likely to be 
targeted/discriminated and face difficulties that their male counterparts do not face 
(Docquier et al., 2009). Other reasons presented by the literature are that females may be less 
able to enter these corruption networks (Swamy et al., 2001), or that they might have a lower 
tolerance against corruption compared to male high skilled individuals (Jha and Sarangi, 
2018). This results in a stronger pull effect for female migrants and therefore at this point 
our suspicion of an additional incentive to migrate seems to be accurate.  
Furthermore, the lack of a significant difference between coefficients for the CPI 
score of the destination country for high skilled men and women is also a very interesting 
effect. It is possible that given that our destination countries are developed countries that 
grant women and men equal rights, the pull effect is similar between both genders (the 
difference between coefficients is non-significant). On the other hand, if similar rights are 
not granted then the negative repercussion of targeting a woman may be lower and therefore 
there is an incentive to target these individuals (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Taking this into 
account, high skilled female individuals may not be au pair with their male counterparts and 
either have more losses (or lack of gains) due to corruption or, for instance, may have to 
spend more resources in protection. In either case there is an additional incentive for this 
                                                        
8 See Table 5 for gender related differences in coefficients. 
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segment of the population to migrate, which is consistent with the results found for the CPI 
score of the origin country. 
However, this effect may not hold for every skill segment. In fact, there is a 
significantly higher effect of the CPI score of the origin country for low skilled male migrants 
than for the same skill level females and this may be due to the role of the man as the income 
provider of the family. Seeing corruption as a kind of taxation on their income reducing it 
below sustainable values, these individuals might have the main responsibility to go abroad 
in order to find income for their families (Docquier et al., 2009) and the previous effect may 
not be as stronger as we thought.  
A counter argument to this may be that, given the low income we expect low skilled 
individuals to have, then low skilled females are more sensitive to corruption than males in 
the sense that after accounting for the costs of corruption they might not be able to support 
the costs of migration. In this scenario, the extra loss of value corruption implies for women 
not only reduces their income, just like for male low skilled migrants, but may also turn the 
option of migrating less viable for females. Therefore, the main difference between gender 
differences for low and high skilled migrants is that high skilled females (assuming a 
corresponding higher level of income) can afford to move despite the negative influence of 
corruption and have an incentive therefore to do so, whereas low skilled may not be able to. 
This may hide (bias) the gender differences (reflected in the regression coefficients) that exist 
in a country. 
As for medium skilled female migrants, it seems that they are not as restricted in their 
ability to move as low skilled females and, on the other hand, they have a lower incentive to 
migrate than high skilled migrants since their gains will be more limited. Therefore, the 
differences between female and male in this segment are not as pronounced and therefore 
non-significant.  
As for the CPI of the destination country, the coefficients are not significant for low 
skilled migrants. These results may be underestimated due to selectiveness of immigration 
laws in OECD countries that gives an advantage to higher skilled migrants. The coefficients 
are also not significant for medium skilled female migrants suggesting a lower selectivity 
based on the corruption criteria in these cases. Furthermore, since destination countries 
(OECD countries) already have a high control of corruption (the average CPI score for the 
destination countries in 2010 is 7.965 whereas the average CPI score for the origin countries 
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is around 4, as we can see in Table 3), there may not be a big gain difference due to less 
corruption for lower skilled migrants between these destination countries.  
The same reasoning may be applied for the CPI score of the destination country for 
female medium skilled migrants. However, for male medium skilled migrants this effect is 
significant, which may be due to the gender role previously mentioned where the lower 
uncertainty or costs caused by low corruption affect male medium migrants since they are 
the ones who are more likely to migrate. 
We are aware that our results might change with an enlargement in the sample of 
destination countries besides OECD countries, including those with low CPI score, since 
the difference in possible gains of migration would be different between countries in such a 
situation, immigration laws might be less restrictive and that is something we must bear in 
mind. 
In conclusion, our results support that for higher skilled migrants the strongest effect 
is the pull effect of (lack of) corruption, that is, the CPI score of the destination country has 
a higher absolute coefficient value than the one for the origin country. On the other hand, 
for lower skilled migrants the strongest of these (and most significant) effects is the push 
effect caused by corruption at the origin country. It seems that high skilled migrants may 
have a higher ability to select the countries they migrate to as stated in Grogger and Hanson 
(2011), seem to face a lower pressure due to corruption in origin and may be better at 
prospering in such an environment. On the other hand, lower skilled migrants seem to be 
more likely to be forced to move out due to adverse conditions (Ivlevs and King, 2017) 
rather than being attracted by external motivators. 
As for the gender dimension of the migration phenomenon, we also find interesting 
results. First, we find that corruption at the home country is stronger for female high skilled 
migrants, reflecting an additional incentive to migrate as predicted by Docquier et al. (2009). 
We also point out some reasons why gender differences between lower skilled migration (low 
and medium skill) may not exhibit a similar behaviour than the previously described. As for 
corruption at the destination country, gender differences are not as pronounced since for 
high skilled these differences are not significant and for low skilled neither the male or female 
coefficient is actually significant. For medium skilled migrants this effect is more relevant to 
male migrants possibly due to the gender role of the male as an income provider. Tables 4 
and 5 resume our findings. 
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Table 4 - Differences in coefficients by skill level 
Variable 
Skill Levels 
Compared 
Difference by skill  
is significant?  
Wald test (equality of 
coefficients)  
Higher effect 
CPI_Origin 
Low-Medium Yes 
11.29 
(0.0008) 
Low 
Medium-High Yes 
5.83 
(0.0157) 
Medium 
High-Low Yes 
18.42 
(0.0000) 
Low 
CPI_Destination  
Low-Medium No 
0.68 
(0.4104) 
- 
Medium-High Yes 
10.21 
(0.0014) 
High 
High-Low Yes 
9.06 
(0.0026) 
High 
Source: Own computation. 
Table 5 - Differences in coefficients by skill level and gender 
Variable Skill Level 
Difference by gender  
is significant?  
Wald test (equality of 
coefficients)  
Higher effect 
CPI_Origin  
All No 
0.04 
(0.8377) 
- 
Low Yes 
4.50 
(0.0338) 
Male 
Medium No 
0.08 
(0.7720) 
- 
High Yes 
6.13 
(0.0133) 
Female 
CPI_Destination  
All No 
0.01 
(0.9275) 
- 
Low Yes 
4.09 
(0.0432) 
Female 
Medium Yes 
18.36 
(0.0000) 
Male 
High No 
0.09 
(0.7653) 
- 
Source: Own computation; Note: P-value in parenthesis. 
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Table 6- Poisson Regression with Robust Standard Errors (PPML) - 2010 
Independent  
Variables 
Overall  Skill Level   Female Migrants Male Migrants 
Migrants Low Medium High  All Skill Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill  All Skill Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill 
             
CPI_Destination 0.233** 
(0.091) 
0.117 
(0.123) 
0.207** 
(0.095) 
0.506*** 
(0.114) 
0.238** 
(0.099) 
0.174 
(0.131) 
0.110 
(0.103) 
0.517*** 
(0.124) 
0.235*** 
(0.090) 
0.068 
(0.122) 
0.292*** 
(0.098) 
0.501*** 
(0.110) 
CPI_Origin -0.265*** 
(0.073) 
-0.429*** 
(0.084) 
-0.261*** 
(0.080) 
-0.140*** 
(0.053) 
-0.268*** 
(0.069) 
-0.407*** 
(0.082) 
-0.257*** 
(0.076) 
-0.165*** 
(0.054) 
-0.263*** 
(0.078) 
-0.451*** 
(0.087) 
-0.268*** 
(0.087) 
-0.115** 
(0.054) 
Colonial_Relationship 1.193*** 
(0.208) 
1.988*** 
(0.359) 
0.703*** 
(0.240) 
0.996*** 
(0.194) 
1.131*** 
(0.186) 
1.855*** 
(0.339) 
0.581** 
(0.227) 
0.982*** 
(0.235) 
1.260*** 
(0.246) 
2.145*** 
(0.383) 
0.835*** 
(0.272) 
1.011*** 
(0.165) 
             
Common_Language 0.512** 
(0.221) 
-0.152 
(0.262) 
0.406 
(0.253) 
0.974*** 
(0.165) 
0.609*** 
(0.206) 
-0.030 
(0.255) 
0.571** 
(0.225) 
1.019*** 
(0.165) 
0.412* 
(0.244) 
-0.293 
(0.275) 
0.241 
(0.297) 
0.927*** 
(0.173) 
             
Common_Religion 0.714** 
(0.322) 
0.881 
(0.550) 
0.823** 
(0.347) 
0.361 
(0.296) 
0.821*** 
(0.318) 
0.898* 
(0.529) 
0.985*** 
(0.343) 
0.531* 
(0.309) 
0.594* 
(0.339) 
0.866 
(0.585) 
0.625* 
(0.368) 
0.177 
(0.295) 
             
Contiguity 0.793 
(0.488) 
1.050** 
(0.438) 
0.646 
(0.474) 
0.289 
(0.399) 
0.763* 
(0.459) 
1.077** 
(0.441) 
0.631 
(0.436) 
0.248 
(0.371) 
0.818 
(0.518) 
1.006** 
(0.436) 
0.652 
(0.516) 
0.332 
(0.435) 
             
             
Distance -0.625*** 
(0.112) 
-1.013*** 
(0.141) 
-0.723*** 
(0.133) 
-0.370*** 
(0.096) 
-0.571*** 
(0.112) 
-0.914*** 
(0.144) 
-0.649*** 
(0.132) 
-0.358*** 
(0.100) 
-0.683*** 
(0.115) 
-1.124*** 
(0.143) 
-0.798*** 
(0.140) 
-0.384*** 
(0.095) 
             
GDPPC_Destination 0.707** 
(0.291) 
0.250 
(0.399) 
1.045*** 
(0.336) 
0.884*** 
(0.222) 
1.185*** 
(0.261) 
0.650* 
(0.354) 
1.827*** 
(0.286) 
1.201*** 
(0.213) 
0.347 
(0.332) 
-0.104 
(0.471) 
0.648 
(0.394) 
0.576** 
(0.249) 
             
GDPPC_Origin 0.307*** 
(0.087) 
0.278*** 
(0.107) 
0.291*** 
(0.098) 
0.329*** 
(0.082) 
0.337*** 
(0.086) 
0.291*** 
(0.106) 
0.317*** 
(0.099) 
0.365*** 
(0.082) 
0.279*** 
(0.090) 
0.264** 
(0.110) 
0.274*** 
(0.101) 
0.291*** 
(0.084) 
             
Inflation_Destination 0.952*** 
(0.207) 
0.468* 
(0.239) 
1.449*** 
(0.248) 
1.142*** 
(0.176) 
0.920*** 
(0.194) 
0.430* 
(0.230) 
1.280*** 
(0.223) 
1.192*** 
(0.176) 
0.979*** 
(0.224) 
0.494** 
(0.250) 
1.595*** 
(0.285) 
1.086*** 
(0.185) 
             
Inflation_Origin -0.040* 
(0.023) 
-0.062 
(0.038) 
-0.053** 
(0.027) 
-0.015 
(0.022) 
-0.040* 
(0.023) 
-0.056 
(0.038) 
-0.048* 
(0.025) 
-0.022 
(0.024) 
-0.041* 
(0.024) 
-0.068* 
(0.040) 
-0.057** 
(0.029) 
-0.008 
(0.021) 
             
Unemp_Destination -0.043 
(0.049) 
-0.149** 
(0.061) 
0.030 
(0.058) 
-0.010 
(0.041) 
-0.014 
(0.048) 
-0.115** 
(0.058) 
0.063 
(0.057) 
0.009 
(0.042) 
-0.062 
(0.054) 
-0.180*** 
(0.066) 
0.024 
(0.063) 
-0.029 
(0.044) 
Unemp_Origin -0.031** 
(0.014) 
-0.038** 
(0.019) 
-0.019 
(0.016) 
-0.036*** 
(0.013) 
-0.034** 
(0.014) 
-0.034* 
(0.019) 
-0.026 
(0.017) 
-0.039*** 
(0.013) 
-0.029* 
(0.015) 
-0.043** 
(0.020) 
-0.014 
(0.017) 
-0.032** 
(0.013) 
             
             
Pop_Destination 0.837*** 
(0.063) 
1.035*** 
(0.089) 
0.674*** 
(0.059) 
0.796*** 
(0.057) 
0.864*** 
(0.062) 
1.047*** 
(0.086) 
0.728*** 
(0.058) 
0.814*** 
(0.061) 
0.824*** 
(0.067) 
1.040*** 
(0.097) 
0.646*** 
(0.063) 
0.784*** 
(0.058) 
             
Pop_Origin 0.558*** 
(0.033) 
0.533*** 
(0.050) 
0.511*** 
(0.035) 
0.593*** 
(0.031) 
0.548*** 
(0.032) 
0.529*** 
(0.049) 
0.506*** 
(0.035) 
0.578*** 
(0.031) 
0.568*** 
(0.035) 
0.539*** 
(0.053) 
0.514*** 
(0.037) 
0.609*** 
(0.033) 
             
Tax_Destination -0.074*** 
(0.013) 
-0.036* 
(0.021) 
-0.122*** 
(0.014) 
-0.095*** 
(0.012) 
-0.062*** 
(0.012) 
-0.027 
(0.019) 
-0.101*** 
(0.013) 
-0.088*** 
(0.012) 
-0.084*** 
(0.014) 
-0.045** 
(0.022) 
-0.138*** 
(0.016) 
-0.102*** 
(0.012) 
Tax_Origin 0.019 
(0.012) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
0.011 
(0.014) 
0.020* 
(0.012) 
0.016 
(0.013) 
0.015 
(0.013) 
0.007 
(0.015) 
0.016 
(0.012) 
0.022* 
(0.012) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
0.015 
(0.014) 
0.024** 
(0.012) 
             
N 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 
pseudo R2 0.730 0.717 0.685 0.770 0.731 0.707 0.698 0.760 0.718 0.720 0.662 0.769 
Wald chi2(17) 1307.878 458.601 904.908 1928.317 1582.268 486.623 900.278 2001.426 1013.328 423.445 782.228 1945.902 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log pseudolikelihood -4.176e+07 -1.825e+07 -1.394e+07 -1.325e+07 -2.090e+07 -9260434.188 -6561661.590 -7224430.601 -2.211e+07 -9375783.447 -7921172.832 -6485112.832 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Source: Own Computation. 
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Table 7- Poisson Regression with Robust Standard Errors (PPML) 2010 - Incidence Rate Ratio 
Independent  
Variables 
Overall  Skill Level   Female Migrants Male Migrants 
Migrants Low Medium High  All Skill Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill  All Skill Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill 
             
CPI_Destination 1.262** 
(0.115) 
1.125 
(0.138) 
1.230** 
(0.117) 
1.658*** 
(0.189) 
1.269** 
(0.126) 
1.190 
(0.156) 
1.116 
(0.115) 
1.676*** 
(0.209) 
1.264*** 
(0.113) 
1.070 
(0.130) 
1.339*** 
(0.131) 
1.651*** 
(0.182) 
             
CPI_Origin 0.767*** 
(0.056) 
0.651*** 
(0.055) 
0.770*** 
(0.062) 
0.869*** 
(0.046) 
0.765*** 
(0.053) 
0.665*** 
(0.055) 
0.774*** 
(0.059) 
0.848*** 
(0.046) 
0.769*** 
(0.060) 
0.637*** 
(0.055) 
0.765*** 
(0.066) 
0.892** 
(0.049) 
Colonial_Relationship 3.297*** 
(0.686) 
7.297*** 
(2.620) 
2.020*** 
(0.486) 
2.707*** 
(0.524) 
3.100*** 
(0.578) 
6.392*** 
(2.169) 
1.788** 
(0.406) 
2.670*** 
(0.626) 
3.526*** 
(0.867) 
8.538*** 
(3.269) 
2.305*** 
(0.626) 
2.748*** 
(0.452) 
             
Common_Language 1.669** 
(0.369) 
0.859 
(0.225) 
1.501 
(0.379) 
2.647*** 
(0.437) 
1.839*** 
(0.378) 
0.971 
(0.248) 
1.770** 
(0.398) 
2.772*** 
(0.456) 
1.510* 
(0.368) 
0.746 
(0.205) 
1.272 
(0.378) 
2.526*** 
(0.436) 
             
Common_Religion 2.042** 
(0.657) 
2.412 
(1.326) 
2.277** 
(0.791) 
1.435 
(0.424) 
2.273*** 
(0.722) 
2.455* 
(1.299) 
2.677*** 
(0.917) 
1.701* 
(0.526) 
1.811* 
(0.615) 
2.377 
(1.391) 
1.868* 
(0.687) 
1.193 
(0.352) 
             
Contiguity 2.211 
(1.080) 
2.857** 
(1.250) 
1.908 
(0.904) 
1.335 
(0.532) 
2.144* 
(0.984) 
2.935** 
(1.294) 
1.879 
(0.819) 
1.282 
(0.475) 
2.266 
(1.174) 
2.734** 
(1.191) 
1.920 
(0.990) 
1.393 
(0.606) 
             
             
Distance 0.535*** 
(0.060) 
0.363*** 
(0.051) 
0.485*** 
(0.065) 
0.691*** 
(0.066) 
0.565*** 
(0.063) 
0.401*** 
(0.058) 
0.522*** 
(0.069) 
0.699*** 
(0.070) 
0.505*** 
(0.058) 
0.325*** 
(0.046) 
0.450*** 
(0.063) 
0.681*** 
(0.065) 
             
GDPPC_Destination 2.028** 
(0.590) 
1.284 
(0.512) 
2.843*** 
(0.955) 
2.420*** 
(0.536) 
3.271*** 
(0.852) 
1.916* 
(0.679) 
6.214*** 
(1.774) 
3.322*** 
(0.708) 
1.415 
(0.470) 
0.902 
(0.424) 
1.913 
(0.754) 
1.779** 
(0.443) 
             
GDPPC_Origin 1.360*** 
(0.118) 
1.321*** 
(0.141) 
1.338*** 
(0.132) 
1.389*** 
(0.114) 
1.400*** 
(0.120) 
1.338*** 
(0.142) 
1.374*** 
(0.136) 
1.440*** 
(0.118) 
1.321*** 
(0.119) 
1.303** 
(0.143) 
1.315*** 
(0.133) 
1.338*** 
(0.113) 
             
Inflation_Destination 2.592*** 
(0.535) 
1.596* 
(0.381) 
4.261*** 
(1.056) 
3.133*** 
(0.552) 
2.508*** 
(0.486) 
1.537* 
(0.353) 
3.596*** 
(0.803) 
3.294*** 
(0.579) 
2.661*** 
(0.595) 
1.638** 
(0.410) 
4.930*** 
(1.407) 
2.963*** 
(0.547) 
             
Inflation_Origin 0.960* 
(0.022) 
0.940 
(0.036) 
0.949** 
(0.025) 
0.985 
(0.022) 
0.960* 
(0.022) 
0.945 
(0.036) 
0.953* 
(0.024) 
0.978 
(0.023) 
0.960* 
(0.023) 
0.934* 
(0.037) 
0.944** 
(0.027) 
0.992 
(0.021) 
             
Unemp_Destination 0.958 
(0.047) 
0.861** 
(0.052) 
1.031 
(0.060) 
0.990 
(0.041) 
0.986 
(0.047) 
0.892** 
(0.052) 
1.065 
(0.060) 
1.009 
(0.042) 
0.940 
(0.050) 
0.835*** 
(0.055) 
1.024 
(0.065) 
0.972 
(0.043) 
Unemp_Origin 0.969** 
(0.014) 
0.963** 
(0.018) 
0.981 
(0.016) 
0.965*** 
(0.013) 
0.967** 
(0.014) 
0.967* 
(0.018) 
0.974 
(0.016) 
0.961*** 
(0.013) 
0.972* 
(0.014) 
0.958** 
(0.019) 
0.986 
(0.016) 
0.968** 
(0.012) 
             
             
Pop_Destination 2.309*** 
(0.145) 
2.816*** 
(0.251) 
1.962*** 
(0.115) 
2.217*** 
(0.127) 
2.372*** 
(0.146) 
2.849*** 
(0.245) 
2.071*** 
(0.121) 
2.258*** 
(0.137) 
2.280*** 
(0.153) 
2.829*** 
(0.275) 
1.907*** 
(0.120) 
2.191*** 
(0.126) 
             
Pop_Origin 1.747*** 
(0.057) 
1.705*** 
(0.086) 
1.666*** 
(0.058) 
1.810*** 
(0.056) 
1.731*** 
(0.055) 
1.697*** 
(0.083) 
1.659*** 
(0.059) 
1.783*** 
(0.055) 
1.765*** 
(0.062) 
1.715*** 
(0.091) 
1.672*** 
(0.063) 
1.838*** 
(0.060) 
             
Tax_Destination 0.929*** 
(0.012) 
0.964* 
(0.020) 
0.885*** 
(0.013) 
0.910*** 
(0.011) 
0.940*** 
(0.011) 
0.974 
(0.019) 
0.904*** 
(0.012) 
0.916*** 
(0.011) 
0.920*** 
(0.013) 
0.956** 
(0.021) 
0.871*** 
(0.014) 
0.903*** 
(0.011) 
Tax_Origin 1.019 
(0.013) 
1.014 
(0.013) 
1.011 
(0.014) 
1.020* 
(0.012) 
1.016 
(0.013) 
1.015 
(0.013) 
1.007 
(0.015) 
1.017 
(0.012) 
1.022* 
(0.013) 
1.014 
(0.013) 
1.015 
(0.014) 
1.024** 
(0.012) 
N 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 
pseudo R2 0.730 0.717 0.685 0.770 0.731 0.707 0.698 0.760 0.718 0.720 0.662 0.769 
Wald chi2(17) 1307.878 458.601 904.908 1928.317 1582.268 486.623 900.278 2001.426 1013.328 423.445 782.228 1945.902 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Log pseudolikelihood -4.176e+07 -1.825e+07 -1.394e+07 -1.325e+07 -2.090e+07 -9260434.188 -6561661.590 -7224430.601 -2.211e+07 -9375783.447 -7921172.832 -6485112.832 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Exponentiated Coefficients; Source: Own Computation. 
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Control variables     
 Regarding control variables, as we can see in Table 6 (and in Table 7), our results are 
also very close to what is shown in the literature. Starting by the existence of a colonial 
relationship between the pairs of countries, we can see that not only this variable is 
significant, but it also has a large positive coefficient in line with the literature, for example 
Docquier et al. (2007).  
All coefficients of the different subsamples are significant at the 1% level, except for 
female medium skilled migrants where the coefficient is significant at 5%. This difference 
between male and female medium skilled migrants may be due to the already mentioned 
different gender roles, that lead to this difference since males are more likely to migrate to 
provide income for their families.  
This gender difference isn’t as clear for low skilled migrants since they depend more 
on the selectivity of immigration laws that give an advantage to higher skilled individual and 
have a lower ability to adapt in the destination country (for instance, they may be able to find 
employment more easily). Therefore, if a colonial relationship lowers migration restrictive 
requirements then the pull/push effect would be stronger for all lower skilled individuals 
and we would not be able to see these gender differences.  
It is easy to see why a colonial a relationship can provide positive and large 
coefficients, since many colonies share similarities in their laws and also some cultural traits 
that improve the adaptation to the destination country (Beine et al., 2016) Furthermore, as 
previously implied, many of these destinations countries provide some benefits or less 
obstacles (less restrictive immigration laws) to the migration of individuals from related 
countries due to their relationship. If two countries share a Colonial Relationship, ceteris 
paribus, then, on average, overall migration between both countries is 3.297 (=e1.193) more 
likely than if they do not share such a trait. This interpretation is similar for other dummy 
variables and for different subsamples. 
 Other cultural variables such as common language and common religion dummies 
have positive and significant results at a 5% level for overall migration, as expected by Beine 
et al. (2016), although Mayda (2010) finds common language to be non-significant. This 
implies that countries that share these traits will be more likely to have more migration 
between them.  
As stated, sharing a common religion also has a significant and positive effect, 
however this effect is not equal among different genders or skill levels. In fact, for male 
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migrants subsamples the significance of this coefficient is always lower than for their female 
counterparts, suggesting that a common religion is more likely to influence the decision to 
migrate of female individuals. Furthermore, for both male and female migrants, the medium 
skilled stratum is the one where a common religion is the most significant.   
When controlling for (not only but especially) colonial relationship we can see that 
having a common language is significant for overall migration. While it is surprising to see 
this lack of effect on lower skilled migrants (possibly since colonial relationship partially 
overlaps the common language dummy), the same cannot be said about high skilled migrants 
whose result is positive as we expected, possibly because a higher skilled migrant has the 
ability to select the best fitting country for him, whereas lower skilled migrants might move 
to where they can and not to where they wish and therefore may not be able to make 
decisions based on common language.  
The results of the contiguity dummy seem to point also in the same direction since, 
despite being non-significant for overall migration (this result is also obtained by Mayda 
(2010), this variable is only significant on the low skill sample (higher coefficient for females), 
and these migrants are the most likely to migrate into neighbour countries possibly due to 
the increased difficulties and costs that they might not be able to support in more distant 
(geographical and culturally since neighbour countries share some cultural traits) countries.  
A different explanation suggests that having a common official primary language 
does not mean that both populations speak the same language. For example, we can point 
out the country pairs (origin-destination respectively) of Angola and Portugal or of Ivory 
Coast and France. In fact, although they share a common language, the origin countries have 
other national languages. It is reasonable to assume that lower levels of education will have 
less contact with the Portuguese/French language and will be less likely to actually know 
how to speak these languages, and rather use a different local language for their everyday life 
(e.g. creole languages). On the other hand, higher skilled individuals may learn this language 
since they have more contact with it in their education years and may be more likely to use 
such a language on an everyday basis. Therefore, this result would demonstrate precisely this 
point, namely that high skilled individuals, unlike low skilled, are influenced by a common 
language because they do know and use the official common language. 
  Within this specification of the model, the GDP per capita of the destination 
country performs as expected for overall migrations with a positive coefficient. For instance, 
for overall migration this coefficient has the interpretation of an elasticity, that is a change in 
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1% of GDP per capita turns on average, ceteris paribus, migration 0.707% more likely. This 
result is also obtained in the literature (e.g. Poprawe, 2015). Theoretically we expect wealthier 
countries to attract more migrants (Beine et al., 2016), and this result holds in most 
regressions. In fact, the effect of the GDP per capita in the destination country is significant 
for medium and high skilled migrants, unlike low skilled probably because they are more 
likely to be limited on their ability to move out of their origin country (they are less likely to 
be able to afford it or to compete for visas). Furthermore, income in these countries might 
not be significantly different for low skilled individuals and so their gains would be rather 
stable among these countries and this would be reflected on the lack of significance.  
This result may also be explained by Vogler and Rotte (2000)’s suggestion that 
relative income might also explain this result since individuals might have a higher aversion 
for being poor when surrounded by wealthier individuals than when surrounded by a poor 
community. This may happen since a lower skill level is also likely to be reflected in a lower 
income; this might also help explaining our results since it is likely that higher skilled 
individuals are better remunerated for their skills in more developed countries, thereby 
increasing relative poverty of these migrants and reducing the incentives to migrate. This 
relative poorness aversion also seems stronger for male migrants than for female for low 
skilled migration.  
If we also differentiate this result by gender, we see that this effect is always 
significant and with positive coefficients for female migrants, but it is only significant for 
high skilled males and even in this case it is less significant than the female counterpart. These 
results may also be linked to a gender pay gap, where countries with lower differences 
between genders attract female migrants. These results suggest that discrimination through 
income may be a cause of concern for female migrants even for these countries with high 
development.  
This reasoning seems to support our previous hypothesis that discrimination of 
gender may have two different sources. First, discrimination reflects itself as an income 
differential between male and female migrants and in this case, there are still significant 
differences even between destination countries. Second, discrimination might result in an 
incentive for corruption to target female individuals as previously explained and, in this case, 
destination countries do not seem to have significant difference between them.  
As for the main gravity variables the results are as expected. Namely, the population 
destination countries have a pull effect on migrants and the population of origin countries 
 
 
42 
 
with higher population have a push effect. Furthermore, the coefficients are higher for the 
pull than for the push effect, a result similar to the one obtained by Poprawe (2015). There 
are no differences of significance between male and female migrants, nor between different 
skill levels. Furthermore, as distance increases there is a dissuasion effect on migration, 
reflecting higher costs associated with dislocation as predicted, for example, in Dimant et al. 
(2013). These might be monetary costs or psychological ones as Vogler and Rotte (2000) 
mention. Similarly, the effect for the population variables is also equally significant among 
subsamples.  
 As for the unemployment variable the results are quite interesting. The results point 
in the sense that the unemployment rate at the destination country has no significant effect 
in overall migration, unlike what is predicted by White and Buehler (2018). However, their 
selection of destination countries is also larger and that may explain the difference between 
these results. Furthermore, this variable is only significant for low skilled migrants reinforcing 
our assumption that they are less able to compete in the labour market and therefore are 
more sensitive to this variable. It also has a stronger effect on low skilled male migrants than 
on female migrants, reinforcing their role as income providers for lower skilled (or educated) 
families and this seems also to be reflected on the corresponding origin variable for low 
skilled migrants.  
The unemployment rate at origin has a negative coefficient for overall migration, and 
it can be interpreted as: a 1 percentage point increase in the unemployment rate at origin, 
ceteris paribus, on average will decrease migration by a factor of 0.969 (1-0.969=3.1% reduction 
of migration). Two effects may be causing this disturbance from expectations, that is higher 
unemployment at origin should lead to more migration (Beine et al., 2016). The first one is 
that the lack of employment might mean lack of income and therefore migrants may not be 
able to afford moving out of the country. If we also consider the effect of the GDP per 
capita of the origin country, we see that higher levels of this variable lead to more migration 
suggesting that the lack of income might be a barrier to migration and that, as this becomes 
less of a burden, individuals will be then more likely to migrate. This effect is similar in 
significance across subsamples.  
The effect of the level of unemployment at origin might be amplified since even 
though individuals might be unemployed they might still receive some social benefits in their 
home countries that they might lose, as suggested by Vogler and Rotte (2000).  
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If we differentiate among different skill levels, it seems that this explanation suits 
better the low skilled individuals. As for high skilled, the high significance may be explained 
by what they have to lose in case of an unsuccessful migration (uncertainty cost.) and a similar 
case may be made for high skilled females vs. their male counterparts. 
Moving forward, even though our taxation variable is a rather broad proxy for 
taxation, the results seem to fit the literature when point that the taxation rate is not 
significant for migration at origin (except for high skilled males). On the other hand, taxation 
at destination does negatively impact the decision to migrate. These results are very similar 
to those obtained by Poprawe (2015). It is easy to understand that, all else constant, an 
individual would rather pay less taxes and have more available income especially for higher 
skilled since the income that is being taxed is higher. This effect is lower for low skilled 
migrants since they are expected.to have a lower income and therefore pay lower taxes. 
Furthermore, it is possible that, since these individuals are the most likely to depend on 
certain social benefits provided by the destination, a lower taxation may not be as important 
due to the effect of this trade off (Beine et al., 2016). It is also at this segment (low skill) that 
there are differences in the significance level between both genders, which relate to our 
previous claim of different gender roles among genders.  
Finally, we also consider the inflation rate just like Poprawe (2015). We find out that 
inflation at the home country decreases migration between a given country pair, and the 
coefficient of this variable increases with the skill level of the migrant leading, and overall it 
has the same effect for both genders. The results suggest high skilled are better able to 
support the negative effects of inflation, namely the loss of real income that is implied (on 
the long run also leads to a weakening of the currency).  
As for the destination country the coefficients of the inflation rate are positive, large 
and significant. Although a higher inflation might suggest a higher macroeconomic 
instability, we suspect that due to the small amount of destination countries and to the fact 
that in 2010 many of them shared a common currency (the euro), these results may be 
misleading. In fact, the inflation rate in these countries, in 2010, varies between 0.89% and 
3.6%, that are rather stable levels. So, we must take into consideration that all destination 
countries are in a relatively stable environment and that this effect would be less pronounced 
if we had more years into the analysis. This effect is rather stable among both genders and 
by skill level. 
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 We will now present the results for the model with two-way fixed effects (time and 
country pair) and compare them with what we found and with what is already established in 
the literature, to see if our results hold or if there may be some additional effects.  
 
4.2. Fixed effects regression 
 
In this section, we extend the previous analysis by estimating a panel data model that controls 
for fixed effects for country pairs and also for years.9 It is important to notice that fixed 
effects models have been used as a sort of robustness checks in the literature.10 This happens 
for instance in Dimant et al. (2013) and in Poprawe (2015). In a nutshell, we can say that our 
results (see Table 8) diverge from the ones showed in the previous section, but the conclusion 
that corruption is an important factor on the decision to migrate is maintained.  
Note that, according to Greene (2011), controlling for country pairs fixed effects 
eliminates some bias that may arise from omitted variables that do not change across time 
but that do change over country pair, for example distance or common official language (it 
does not change in this period) between countries; it is now accounted in this term. On the 
other hand, controlling for time fixed effects eliminates the bias that may arise from variables 
that affect all the country pairs, for instance, the existence of a global financial crisis that 
affects the results for 2010. The interpretation of coefficients is similar to the previous model. 
In this model, our analysis takes into account both the variety of CPI scores of 
destination and origin countries and the changes in this score across time. The results show 
an inversion of the sign of the coefficient for the CPI score at the origin country.  
However, this result can still be explained by the theoretical mechanisms previously 
suggested. In fact, if we consider that in order to migrate an individual must have the ability 
to cover the implied costs (a certain threshold for income that when reached makes the 
individual move into another country), then an increase in the CPI score implies a decrease 
in perceived corruption and therefore a lower cost for individuals (a view of corruption as a 
kind of taxation on income). This lower expenditure will bring the income value of 
individuals closer to the migration threshold and therefore lead to higher migration stocks 
between a given country pair. In a different perspective, this effect of an increase of 
                                                        
9 Note that the test for the relevance of time fixed effects is provided in appendix 1. 
10 As previously mentioned, the usage of different specifications has also been suggested as a robustness test. 
So, even though we will not analyze the negative binomial and the zero inflated Poisson regressions, we will 
present these regressions in the appendix 2 to 5. 
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corruption across time, that implies lower migration stocks from the same origin country to 
a destination, may be stronger than the effect of a similar change of the corruption level 
across countries, that implies higher migration stocks between country pairs and therefore 
lead to this change in the expected sign of the coefficient. 
The significance of coefficients is similar across gender and across different skill 
levels. However, if we discriminate our results for both gender and skill level some 
differences arise. The significance level is lower for low skilled as they are further apart this 
migration threshold, and so this effect is lessened in this subsample since they may not be 
able to afford the costs of migration, even if they want to. Furthermore, despite overall 
migration does not show a difference in significance levels, for each single skill level the 
effect is more significant for females than for males, so the gender differences that arise due 
to corruption in the origin are more pronounced in this model than in the last.  
As for the CPI score of the destination country, it generally behaves in a similar way 
to the one that is proposed in the previous section, although there is no effect of corruption 
in the destination country on high skilled migration, in opposition to what occurs in the 
previous model. However, if high skilled migrants do have a better ability to handle 
corruption then this result might just mean that, given the destination countries, there is not 
a significant difference on corruption levels that justifies migration. In fact, Table 9 shows 
that the CPI score of destination country loses its attraction power on high skilled migrants 
faster than, for example, medium skilled. Furthermore, the maximum attraction point is 
reached at a CPI score of 7.835 a value that is lower than many of our destinations countries 
scores (89 cases out of 140 possible). As for the difference in significance between medium 
and low skilled individuals, this may be due to a higher proximity of the migration decision 
threshold (low skilled are less likely to be able to afford dislocations). 
As for gender differences, they only emerge in the low skilled segment, exposing the 
effect we had claimed to be hidden, that is corruption may take an extra value from female 
migrants that further distances them from this threshold. Table 9 supports this finding and 
further approaches the panel and regular Poisson models. In fact, gender role effects and the 
fact that female migrants may not be able to afford migration also appear to be reflected in 
these regressions. Furthermore, the reverse role in medium skilled migration reflect the gains 
from the reduction of gender related corruption and that this segment of the population can 
afford migration costs. Finally, high skilled female migrants have a less significant reduction 
of the attraction of this score, also reflecting an extra cost of corruption. 
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Table 8 - Poisson two-way fixed effects regression with robust standard errors, 1980-2010 
Independent  Overall   Skill Level    Female Migrants Male Migrants 
Variables Migrants Low Medium High  All Skill Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill  All Skill Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill 
CPI_Destination 
0.140*** 0.128** 0.172*** 0.0392 0.133*** 0.121** 0.185*** 0.0298 0.146*** 0.130* 0.155*** 0.0494 
(0.0338) (0.0591) (0.0421) (0.0365) (0.0343) (0.0564) (0.0448) (0.0384) (0.0368) (0.0667) (0.0442) (0.0381) 
CPI_Origin 
0.0495** 0.0753** 0.0970** 0.0470** 0.0519** 0.0773** 0.109*** 0.0553*** 0.0477** 0.0724* 0.0864** 0.0412** 
(0.0223) (0.0361) (0.0385) (0.0200) (0.0221) (0.0328) (0.0369) (0.0204) (0.0237) (0.0438) (0.0398) (0.0209) 
GDPPC_Destination 
0.468*** 0.464*** 0.363*** 0.546*** 0.413*** 0.341** 0.302** 0.493*** 0.527*** 0.611*** 0.419*** 0.586*** 
(0.102) (0.171) (0.126) (0.0838) (0.108) (0.151) (0.141) (0.0851) (0.104) (0.217) (0.125) (0.0864) 
GDPPC_Origin 
0.234*** 0.157* 0.327*** 0.237*** 0.269*** 0.197** 0.373*** 0.268*** 0.196** 0.110 0.279** 0.207*** 
(0.0802) (0.0941) (0.102) (0.0667) (0.0780) (0.0848) (0.0980) (0.0650) (0.0846) (0.111) (0.109) (0.0712) 
Inflation_Destination 
-0.0248*** -0.0213** -0.0268** -0.0440*** -0.0158 -0.00904 -0.000303 -0.0557*** -0.0273*** -0.0254** -0.0349*** -0.0367*** 
(0.00838) (0.0106) (0.0120) (0.0104) (0.0130) (0.0140) (0.0199) (0.0139) (0.00791) (0.0107) (0.0114) (0.00861) 
Inflation_Origin 
-0.000288*** -0.000184 -0.000474*** -0.000170** -0.000329*** -0.000232** -0.000468*** -0.000227*** -0.000240*** -0.000131 -0.000460*** -0.000104 
(0.0000755) (0.000123) (0.0000964) (0.0000726) (0.0000683) (0.0000924) (0.0000977) (0.0000663) (0.0000896) (0.000184) (0.000113) (0.0000772) 
Unemp_Destination 
0.00292 0.0373** -0.00930 -0.0228** 0.00235 0.0344** 0.000283 -0.0323*** 0.00402 0.0409** -0.0175* -0.0140 
(0.00967) (0.0158) (0.0103) (0.00977) (0.0103) (0.0148) (0.0127) (0.0106) (0.0103) (0.0183) (0.0106) (0.00986) 
Unemp_Origin 
0.0148*** 0.0121* 0.0253** 0.0108** 0.0161*** 0.0123* 0.0271*** 0.0144*** 0.0133** 0.0115* 0.0229** 0.00792 
(0.00564) (0.00658) (0.0100) (0.00469) (0.00554) (0.00693) (0.00981) (0.00472) (0.00591) (0.00665) (0.0102) (0.00493) 
Pop_Destination 
1.346** 0.781 2.086** -1.365*** 0.924 0.327 1.289 -1.686*** 1.677** 1.121 2.450** -0.956** 
(0.661) (1.034) (0.937) (0.457) (0.614) (0.951) (0.894) (0.477) (0.725) (1.131) (1.003) (0.473) 
Pop_Origin 
2.326*** 2.870*** 2.212*** 1.614*** 2.259*** 2.744*** 2.181*** 1.526*** 2.409*** 3.013*** 2.273*** 1.720*** 
(0.359) (0.581) (0.584) (0.238) (0.329) (0.532) (0.562) (0.249) (0.395) (0.626) (0.601) (0.241) 
Tax_Destination 
-0.0248*** -0.0192 -0.0130 -0.0100 -0.0188* -0.00982 -0.00739 -0.00628 -0.0320*** -0.0299* -0.0225** -0.0152 
(0.00923) (0.0154) (0.00848) (0.00893) (0.00962) (0.0156) (0.00870) (0.00936) (0.00941) (0.0160) (0.00914) (0.00935) 
Tax_Origin 
-0.00233 0.00161 0.00299 0.0107* -0.00326 0.00378 0.00441 0.00929 -0.00107 -0.000491 0.00217 0.0129** 
(0.00645) (0.00846) (0.00911) (0.00555) (0.00654) (0.00812) (0.00889) (0.00591) (0.00663) (0.00934) (0.00963) (0.00555) 
N 6478 6415 6418 6465 6372 6248 6259 6286 6453 6322 6333 6400 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Source: Own Computation. 
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Table 9 - Poisson two-way fixed effects regression with robust standard errors (with squared CPI of destination country), 1980-2010 
Independent  Overall   Skill Level   Female Migrants Male Migrants 
Variables Migrants Low Medium High  All Skill Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill  All Skill Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill 
CPI_Destination 
0.439** 0.175 0.750*** 0.514*** 0.401** 0.246 0.657** 0.433*** 0.463** 0.839*** 0.0858 0.647*** 
(0.188) (0.275) (0.254) (0.164) (0.200) (0.291) (0.258) (0.164) (0.208) (0.285) (0.310) (0.176) 
CPI_Destination2 
-0.0207 -0.00321 -0.0424** -0.0328*** -0.0185 -0.00843 -0.0343* -0.0280** -0.0220 -0.0503** 0.00300 -0.0412*** 
(0.0126) (0.0184) (0.0187) (0.0112) (0.0132) (0.0195) (0.0184) (0.0111) (0.0140) (0.0209) (0.0206) (0.0122) 
CPI_Origin 
0.0496** 0.0754** 0.0992*** 0.0475** 0.0524** 0.0775** 0.112*** 0.0559*** 0.0474** 0.0878** 0.0724* 0.0413** 
(0.0218) (0.0360) (0.0379) (0.0198) (0.0217) (0.0324) (0.0366) (0.0203) (0.0232) (0.0388) (0.0440) (0.0206) 
GDPPC_Destination 
0.492*** 0.467*** 0.432*** 0.581*** 0.446*** 0.353** 0.392** 0.532*** 0.543*** 0.474*** 0.609*** 0.619*** 
(0.105) (0.178) (0.129) (0.0848) (0.115) (0.163) (0.153) (0.0861) (0.108) (0.129) (0.220) (0.0875) 
GDPPC_Origin 
0.237*** 0.158* 0.330*** 0.240*** 0.271*** 0.198** 0.376*** 0.271*** 0.198** 0.282*** 0.109 0.210*** 
(0.0798) (0.0945) (0.102) (0.0660) (0.0777) (0.0851) (0.0979) (0.0644) (0.0842) (0.109) (0.112) (0.0703) 
Inflation_Destination 
-0.0241*** -0.0211** -0.0265** -0.0454*** -0.0153 -0.00842 -0.000216 -0.0589*** -0.0266*** -0.0342*** -0.0255** -0.0370*** 
(0.00820) (0.0102) (0.0118) (0.0104) (0.0127) (0.0130) (0.0197) (0.0140) (0.00790) (0.0114) (0.0106) (0.00844) 
Inflation_Origin 
-0.000280*** -0.000182 -0.000458*** -0.000160** -0.000323*** -0.000228** -0.000458*** -0.000219*** -0.000230** -0.000438*** -0.000133 -0.0000901 
(0.0000765) (0.000124) (0.0000955) (0.0000734) (0.0000683) (0.0000942) (0.0000964) (0.0000663) (0.0000916) (0.000114) (0.000182) (0.0000790) 
Unemp_Destination 
0.00703 0.0379** -0.000802 -0.0163* 0.00673 0.0361** 0.00940 -0.0264*** 0.00779 -0.00901 0.0405** -0.00647 
(0.00998) (0.0159) (0.0114) (0.00947) (0.0108) (0.0152) (0.0144) (0.0102) (0.0107) (0.0118) (0.0184) (0.00956) 
Unemp_Origin 
0.0148*** 0.0121* 0.0252** 0.0107** 0.0160*** 0.0123* 0.0269*** 0.0142*** 0.0133** 0.0229** 0.0114* 0.00774 
(0.00555) (0.00657) (0.00992) (0.00466) (0.00548) (0.00693) (0.00977) (0.00469) (0.00580) (0.0101) (0.00666) (0.00489) 
Pop_Destination 
1.412** 0.790 2.151** -1.264*** 0.997 0.354 1.403 -1.573*** 1.740** 2.505** 1.112 -0.846* 
(0.651) (1.019) (0.922) (0.452) (0.609) (0.945) (0.875) (0.474) (0.712) (0.992) (1.111) (0.463) 
Pop_Origin 
2.321*** 2.870*** 2.178*** 1.607*** 2.253*** 2.742*** 2.147*** 1.519*** 2.407*** 2.236*** 3.013*** 1.715*** 
(0.359) (0.581) (0.583) (0.238) (0.328) (0.532) (0.560) (0.249) (0.395) (0.600) (0.627) (0.241) 
Tax_Destination 
-0.0203** -0.0186 -0.00167 -0.00332 -0.0146 -0.00826 0.00245 -0.000198 -0.0274*** -0.00948 -0.0305* -0.00727 
(0.00957) (0.0165) (0.0108) (0.00871) (0.0103) (0.0168) (0.0113) (0.00914) (0.00953) (0.0110) (0.0169) (0.00917) 
Tax_Origin 
-0.00227 0.00163 0.00339 0.0109* -0.00322 0.00385 0.00470 0.00943 -0.000963 0.00268 -0.000523 0.0132** 
(0.00641) (0.00849) (0.00903) (0.00558) (0.00649) (0.00812) (0.00887) (0.00592) (0.00660) (0.00953) (0.00940) (0.00559) 
N 6478 6415 6418 6465 6372 6248 6259 6286 6453 6322 6333 6400 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Source: Own Computation. 
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Control variables 
 When controlling for fixed effects of time and country pairs, we can see that the 
variable of the population of the origin keeps the push effect (more people also means more 
possible migrants). This effect has a similar significance across gender and skill. As for the 
population at the destination country, there are significant gender differences. The 
population of the destination country is not significant for females, but it is for males.  
Analysing the pull effect for different skill levels we can see that population at the 
destiny country is not significant at attracting low skilled individuals supporting the argument 
that, for lower levels skills, individuals are more likely to be pushed out than pulled in. This 
variable has a positive and significant effect for medium skilled reflecting that an increase in 
skill may reflect the ability to successfully migrate into these countries (Mountford, 1997).  
For high skilled this effect is negative suggesting that highly populated countries 
attract less of these individuals. It is possible that these skills may not be as easily transferable 
or that their social status might be harder to maintain, also reflecting the aversion of migrants 
to become relatively poorer when moving as Vogler and Rotte (2000) suggest. 
Our taxation and unemployment variables allow us to differentiate whether it is the 
pull or the push effect that has a higher effect on migrants. For instance, the unemployment 
at home country leads to more migration suggesting that the results obtained in 2010 were 
also influenced by the economic crisis and its negative effect on the economy and posterior 
difficulties in the financial market. The coefficients are lower for low skilled migrants since 
these individuals may have more difficulty at finding a replacement work that suits their skills 
when unemployed and, therefore, have a higher income dependence that prohibits them 
from migrating. The opposite effect is registered for high skilled individuals. The results are 
rather similar between both genders.  
However, the difference between significances increases as skill level rises, 
culminating with a 1% significant effect for high skilled female migrants vs. a non-significant 
effect for males. It seems like male are better able to compete at origin country than female 
and this may be the result of some kind of discrimination against women. 
On the other hand, the unemployment rate provides a significant push effect for 
high skilled migrants. Uncertainty of finding a job and having a successful migration increase 
the costs of migration and decreases this migration stocks (Beine et al., 2016). For lower 
skilled migrants, they may be forced to move out of their country and be able to migrate 
despite the adverse conditions rather than choosing to move to countries with higher 
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unemployment. Social benefits that these countries may provide may also explain the positive 
sign, as even unemployed these low skilled migrants may insure an income higher than the 
one they would obtain in their home country with these benefits (Beine et al., 2016).  
Concerning taxation level at origin, it seems that its effect only affects male high 
skilled individuals, as previously reported. It is easy to understand this since a higher income 
implies a higher absolute taxation (and in some countries with progressive tax rates also 
higher relative taxation), the high skilled migrants will pay a higher cost and therefore are 
also the ones that have more to gain by changing to a country where, with similar conditions, 
they pay less taxes and have more available income.  
Taxation level at the destination country is significant and has a negative coefficient 
for overall migration but is not significant in any of the regressions by skill (for both genders). 
A deeper analysis shows that this is result is mostly for male migrants being significant in all 
but the high skill level. But for female migrants this is not so, and this is probably due to the 
role of women in migration, that is to reunite with their abroad partner although according 
to our results that seems to be changing. This variable loses some importance in explaining 
migration.  
When it comes to GDP per capita, in the home country the results are very similar 
to the ones of the previous model, in the sense that there is a significant and positive variable 
that states that a country with higher income also has more overall migration. The 
coefficients are similar for medium and high skilled regressions. As for low skilled this effect 
is less significant since they may be further way from the migration threshold. In this skill 
level, female migrants are also more restrained by their income than their male counterparts. 
These results are consistent with the first model and, therefore, so is the previous justification 
for this effect that we presented, especially since the coefficients are very similar to the ones 
in our first model.  
GDP per capita in the destination country has a much similar effect between skill 
levels and genders in this model comparing with the previous model. When taking into 
account the multiple year observations the effect seems to harmonize among the various 
stratus considered. So, the difficulties of having rather homogenous destination countries 
seem to be lessened (as expected) by the inclusion of observations for different years. Despite 
this, lower skilled migrants (medium and low) have a lower significance in their female 
subsamples. 
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As for the inflation rate at the home country, it seems to have a negative coefficient, 
similarly to what we previously described but very close to zero and female migrants seem 
to be more influenced by the economic stability that inflation reflects. On the other hand, 
the inflation rate at the destination country has a negative coefficient, as it seems that the 
inclusion of extra observations show that the instability related to a higher inflation (above a 
certain level) and the weaker currency effect (translates into a lower available income) may 
reduce migration. This effect is more significant for high skilled individuals (in this case 
gender differences are not relevant) and for male migrants reflecting a stronger pull effect 
caused by this factor. Table 10 presents a summary of the results we have obtained and 
discussed in this chapter.11 
In the next chapter we shall state our final conclusions, as well as present some main 
limitations but also future research paths. 
                                                        
11 We also present in appendix 6 a literature summary in order to contextualize the main literature on both 
migration and corruption (works that only cover one of these issues are not presented).    
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Table 10 – Results: a sum up 
                                                        
12 Note that: “Overall” corresponds to the regression with the same name; “Skill” refers to the three regressions contained in “Skill Level” and “Gender” corresponds to the 
“All Skill” regression by gender. Finally, comments about the combination of both these layers are also presented when necessary in “Extra”. 
Variable Layer12 Poisson – 2010 Poisson Panel 1980-2010 In Favor Against 
CPI_Destination 
Overall Positive and Significant Sign Positive and Significant Sign Poprawe (2015)  None  
Skill  Stronger Effect for High Skilled Migrants More Significant for Medium then Low Skilled Migrants Dimant et al. (2013)    
Gender Constant Among Gender Constant Among Gender Ariu and Squicciarini (2013)   
Extra Females seem to be the most affected gender. Females seem to be the most affected gender.   
CPI_Origin 
Overall Negative and Significant Sign Positive and Significant Sign Poprawe (2015)  All of those at left   
Skill  Effect Decreases with Skill Constant Among Skill Dimant et al. (2013)   (Panel Model) 
Gender Constant Among Gender Constant Among Gender Ariu and Squicciarini (2013)  Mariani (2007) 
Extra Females seem to be the most affected gender. Females seem to be the most affected gender.   
Colonial_Relationship 
Overall Positive and Significant Sign 
- 
Docquier et al. (2007)  Mayda (2010)  
Skill  Constant Among Skill  Beine et al. (2016)   
Gender Constant Among Gender  Vogler and Rotte (2000)   
Common_Language 
Overall Positive and Significant Sign 
- 
 Beine et al. (2016) Mayda (2010)  
Skill  Only Significant for High Skilled Migrants  Vogler and Rotte (2000)   
Gender More Significative for Females     
Common_Religion 
Overall Positive and Significant Sign 
- 
 Beine et al. (2016) None  
Skill  Only Significant for Medium Skilled Migrants  Vogler and Rotte (2000)   
Gender More Significant for Females     
Contiguity 
Overall Non-Significant (Positive) 
- 
 Beine et al. (2016) None   
Skill  Only Significant for Low Skilled Migrants  Vogler and Rotte (2000)   
Gender More Significant for Females Mayda (2010)    
Distance 
Overall Positive and Significant Sign 
- 
 Beine et al. (2016) None  
Skill  Constant Among Skill Dimant et al. (2013)   
Gender Constant Among Gender  Poprawe (2015)   
GDPPC_Destination 
Overall Positive and Significant Sign Positive and Significant Sign  Beine et al. (2016) None  
Skill  Significant for Medium and High Skilled Migrants Constant Among Skill  Vogler and Rotte (2000)   
Gender More Significant for Females Constant Among Gender   Poprawe (2015)   
Extra Females seem to be the most affected gender. Females seem to be the most affected gender.   
GDPPC_Origin 
Overall Positive and Significant Sign Positive and Significant Sign  Beine et al. (2016) None 
Skill  Constant Among Skill More Significant for Medium and High Skilled Migrants  Vogler and Rotte (2000)   
Gender Constant Among Gender More Significant for Females   Poprawe (2015)   
Extra Females seem to be the most affected gender. Females seem to be the most affected gender.   
Source Own Computation 
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Table 10 – Results: a sum up (continuation) 
 
 Source: Own Computation.  
Variable Layer Poisson - 2010  Poisson Panel 1980-2010 In Favour Against 
Inflation_Destination 
Overall Positive and Significant Sign Negative and Significant Sign   Poprawe (2015)    Poprawe (2015)  
Skill  More Significant for Medium and High Skilled Migrants More Significant for High Skilled Migrants  (In the Panel model)  (In the 2010 model) 
Gender Constant Among Gender More Significant for Males     
Inflation_Origin 
Overall Negative and Significant Sign Negative and Significant Sign   Poprawe (2015)    None 
Skill  Only Significant for Medium Skilled Migrants More Significative for Medium then High Skilled     
Gender Constant Among Gender Constant Among Gender     
Unemp_Destination 
Overall Non-Significant (Negative) Non-Significant (Positive)  Beine et al. (2016)  White and Buehler (2018)  
Skill  Only Significant for Low Skilled Migrants More Significative for High and Low Skilled Mayda (2010)   
Gender Non-Significant for Both Genders Non-Significant for Both Genders     
Unemp_Origin 
Overall Negative and Significant Sign Positive and Significant Sign   Beine et al. (2016) Mayda (2010)  
Skill  More Significative for High then Low Skilled Migrants More Significative for Medium and High Skilled   White and Buehler (2018)  
Gender More Significant for Females More Significant for Females     
Pop_Destination 
Overall Positive and Significant Sign Positive and Significant Sign  Beine et al. (2016)   None 
Skill  Constant Among Skill Negative Sign for High and Positive for Medium Skilled   Vogler and Rotte (2000)   
Gender Constant Among Gender More significant for Males   Poprawe (2015)   
Pop_Origin 
Overall Positive and Significant Sign Positive and Significant Sign  Beine et al. (2016)   None 
Skill  Constant Among Skill Constant Among Skill  Vogler and Rotte (2000)   
Gender Constant Among Gender Constant Among Gender   Poprawe (2015)   
Tax_Destination 
Overall Negative and Significant Sign Negative and Significant Sign  Poprawe (2015)    None 
Skill  More Significative for Medium and High Skilled Migrants Non-Significant across Skill Level Grogger and Hanson (2011)      
Gender Constant Among Gender More Significative for Males     
Tax_Origin 
Overall Non-Significant (Positive) Non-Significant (Negative)  Poprawe (2015)  Grogger and Hanson (2011)   
Skill  Only Significant for High Skilled Migrants Only Significant for High Skilled Migrants (Positive)    
Gender More Significative for Males Non-Significant for Both Genders     
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Chapter 5. Conclusions 
 
In this dissertation, we started with a brief introduction and explanation about what 
motivated us into researching these complex issues of corruption and migration, namely the 
relevance of this work lies on the profound social and economic implications of both 
migration and corruption. Moreover, the significant gap in the existing literature, which we 
aimed to cover, also supports the relevance of our work. 
 To expose these gaps that we aimed to fill, we presented the literature about 
international migration, discussing both theoretical and empirical works. At the same time, 
we explored the literature on corruption in order to highlight the undesirable effects of 
corruption for an economy in general and for individuals in particular. We then brought 
studies that explored both issues to find a theoretical (and empirical) framework for our 
analysis. 
After that we presented as clearly as possible how we planned to study this topic, 
namely by justifying the decisions we made related to our model and variables (like the choice 
of indicators). These decisions were based on finding answers for three different questions: 
1. Is corruption a significant push and/or pull factor for (overall) migrants? 
2. Has corruption different impact between skilled and non-skilled migration?  
3. Is this effect similar between male and female migrants? 
 According to our analysis, we can answer the first research question affirmatively. 
Corruption is a significant push and also a significant pull factor for overall migration. We 
find that less perceived corruption at home increases the number of inward migrants and 
that a higher level of corruption at the destination countries decreases migration into these 
countries. This result is in accordance with previous literature. What is new about this finding 
is that we found this result to be significant in our panel gravity model, using not only cross-
sectional data but also a time-series and this is a new dimension of analysis in the literature. 
However, this new dimension seems to have changed the expected signal (not only due to 
our regular Poisson model but also due to the literature) of the corruption at origin variable 
in the fixed effects model. It is important to highlight that these two results are not mutually 
exclusive, and that there seems to be an extra effect, namely the loss or gain of the ability to 
migrate by those near the migration threshold, that leads to this result.  
This important result that arises through the introduction of a time dimension should 
be further tested and that may be a lead for further investigation. Experimenting with 
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different datasets is necessary to see if our conclusions still hold, or if we may be mistaking 
this signal change with the interference of heterogenic individual effects on corruption. Some 
independent variables may also be tested by the usage of a different instrument. For instance, 
a non-perceptual corruption indicator, marginal tax rates or an indicator that measures the 
unemployment gap rather than the level of unemployment  may provide some additional 
insights. Furthermore, the usage of a different government quality variable may also be a 
future path to follow. For instance, a political stability indicator could be used as an 
alternative to the CPI, like it happens in institutional literature. Finally, finding (and 
theoretically explaining) if there is a non-linear relationship between migration and 
corruption (also on gender and skill) may also be a crucial research path. 
As for our second research question, throughout our work we have pointed out 
significant differences and given possible explanations based on our theoretical foundations 
about the existence of differences in the impact of corruption across skill levels. 
Furthermore, these differences are captured in both models, clearly supporting this finding. 
In summary, it seems that unlike what the literature predicted, high skilled individuals are 
not the most likely to migrate, but rather seem to be the less likely group to be affected by 
corruption. Adding to that, we found that the effect of corruption on low skilled migrants 
may be lessened by their inability to migrate. Another finding that is important to highlight 
is that corruption at the origin country affects different skilled individuals in a different way 
than corruption at destination.  
As for the final question, in our analysis we found significant gender differences in 
the effect of corruption that to our knowledge have never been studied. However, if we 
simply compare overall female and male migration these differences are not significant. In 
fact, these gender differences remain hidden unless we add the extra skill level layer of 
analysis. When both gender and skill levels are taken into account, these gender differences 
emerge, and it seems to reflect an extra incentive in origin countries to target the female 
population segment. Our results also seem to demonstrate that this discrimination through 
corruption appears to be less significant in developed countries. 
 These extra layers of analysis, namely gender and skill, still need to be explored in 
this literature since there are not many studies dedicated to them. Studies with a higher level 
of detail may be useful; a particular case is the study of the interaction between the variables 
in economies with lower restrictions to migration movements such as the European Union.  
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The main limitation to further research is the lack of data around corruption and 
migration. Luckily there has been an increase in the awareness of the importance of these 
two issues. Another limitation may be the lack of motivation for decision makers to follow 
measures to end corruption and so inertia by these individuals may decrease the incentives 
for the study of this issue. Another limitation that can also be seen as an opportunity is that 
both these issues are always evolving. So, it is possibly that due to lack of access to data we 
can only focus on explaining the past, therefore always being one step behind reality and not 
be able to make decisions when they are most needed. 
Despite this, we believe our findings are still important for decision makers linked to 
issues of economic development in general, and migration in particular. The existence of 
higher levels corruption in lower developed countries may prove to harm these economies 
in the short and long run. Corruption has a repelling effect for individuals, driving away 
important human resources and harming more than just the simple wealth of individuals, 
affecting their well-being. Since lower skilled individuals are also more likely to have lower 
income, this effect is even more hurtful since they may not have the possibility to move out 
or protect themselves. Therefore, our results point out the need to control corruption, 
especially in the cases where individuals cannot protect themselves.  
Finally, our results also point to the need of protecting female individuals. A higher 
effort to promote equality may prove useful to decline an excessive brain drain. This is 
particularly important given that the education level of females is particularly important for 
economic growth (Docquier et al., 2009). 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 - Year fixed effects redundancy test 
 
Gender-Skill Level Wald Test P-value 
Overall_Migrants 85.37 0.0000 
Low Skill_Migrants 43.34 0.0000 
Medium Skill_Migrants 87.07 0.0000 
High Skill_Migrants 104.11 0.0000 
Male_Migrants 75.45 0.0000 
Male_Low Skill_Migrants 41.96 0.0000 
Male_Medium Skill_Migrants 89.58 0.0000 
Male_High Skill_Migrants 88.17 0.0000 
Female_ Migrants 61.06 0.0000 
Female_Low Skill_Migrants 36.91 0.0000 
Female_Medium Skill_Migrants 59.45 0.0000 
Female_High Skill_Migrants 115.33 0.0000 
Source: Own computation 
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Appendix 2 - Negative Binomial regression with robust standard errors, 2010 
Independent  
Variables 
Overall  Skill Level   Female Migrants Male Migrants 
Migrants Low Medium High  All Skill Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill  All Skill Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill 
             
CPI_Destination 0.412*** 0.358*** 0.397*** 0.459*** 0.290*** 0.273*** 0.241*** 0.355*** 0.467*** 0.369*** 0.463*** 0.536*** 
 (0.075) (0.087) (0.079) (0.071) (0.073) (0.087) (0.077) (0.070) (0.080) (0.090) (0.084) (0.076) 
CPI_Origin -0.068 -0.177*** -0.035 -0.048 -0.097** -0.197*** -0.070 -0.074* -0.045 -0.155** -0.012 -0.028 
 (0.046) (0.060) (0.048) (0.039) (0.046) (0.059) (0.048) (0.041) (0.048) (0.062) (0.051) (0.040) 
Colonial_Relationship 2.447*** 2.858*** 2.066*** 1.921*** 2.674*** 3.156*** 2.432*** 1.969*** 2.372*** 2.780*** 1.935*** 1.927*** 
 (0.406) (0.409) (0.539) (0.373) (0.482) (0.499) (0.647) (0.433) (0.378) (0.372) (0.495) (0.338) 
             
Common_Language 1.094*** 0.752*** 1.150*** 1.476*** 1.308*** 0.989*** 1.449*** 1.588*** 1.025*** 0.647*** 1.060*** 1.424*** 
 (0.155) (0.229) (0.158) (0.131) (0.165) (0.235) (0.178) (0.142) (0.156) (0.228) (0.162) (0.129) 
             
Common_Religion 0.902*** 1.593*** 0.451** 0.051 0.779*** 1.376*** 0.345 0.086 0.881*** 1.624*** 0.380 -0.020 
 (0.284) (0.353) (0.224) (0.195) (0.275) (0.339) (0.225) (0.193) (0.296) (0.363) (0.240) (0.207) 
             
Contiguity -0.344 -0.064 -0.326 -0.465* -0.134 0.256 -0.105 -0.402 -0.542* -0.305 -0.512* -0.514** 
 (0.274) (0.350) (0.262) (0.258) (0.298) (0.369) (0.286) (0.299) (0.282) (0.389) (0.272) (0.243) 
             
6             
Distance -0.879*** -0.924*** -1.000*** -0.773*** -0.807*** -0.838*** -0.897*** -0.741*** -0.956*** -1.019*** -1.087*** -0.806*** 
 (0.074) (0.091) (0.072) (0.066) (0.077) (0.092) (0.075) (0.072) (0.078) (0.096) (0.076) (0.067) 
             
GDPPC_Destination 0.614*** 0.556** 0.207 0.745*** 1.433*** 1.528*** 1.152*** 1.230*** 0.277 0.171 -0.111 0.448** 
 (0.209) (0.246) (0.178) (0.170) (0.223) (0.262) (0.201) (0.173) (0.222) (0.259) (0.197) (0.189) 
             
GDPPC_Origin 0.340*** 0.266** 0.331*** 0.508*** 0.409*** 0.327*** 0.412*** 0.572*** 0.299*** 0.238** 0.288*** 0.458*** 
 (0.082) (0.108) (0.078) (0.068) (0.085) (0.111) (0.083) (0.074) (0.083) (0.108) (0.080) (0.067) 
             
Inflation_Destination 0.997*** 0.718*** 1.021*** 1.024*** 0.875*** 0.634*** 0.795*** 0.972*** 1.047*** 0.737*** 1.128*** 1.036*** 
 (0.126) (0.149) (0.119) (0.112) (0.123) (0.144) (0.123) (0.115) (0.136) (0.161) (0.132) (0.121) 
             
Inflation_Origin -0.022 -0.049*** -0.015 0.011 -0.024 -0.051*** -0.018 0.013 -0.018 -0.039** -0.010 0.009 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) 
             
Unemp_Destination 0.008 -0.056 0.028 0.021 0.001 -0.064 0.036 0.013 0.010 -0.054 0.030 0.022 
 (0.039) (0.045) (0.039) (0.035) (0.039) (0.044) (0.040) (0.035) (0.042) (0.049) (0.041) (0.038) 
Unemp_Origin 0.036*** 0.028** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.028** 0.034*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.024** 0.041*** 0.035*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) 
             
             
Pop_Destination 1.041*** 1.028*** 1.053*** 1.172*** 1.147*** 1.167*** 1.143*** 1.247*** 0.988*** 0.954*** 1.022*** 1.113*** 
 (0.063) (0.069) (0.054) (0.043) (0.066) (0.071) (0.059) (0.049) (0.065) (0.073) (0.057) (0.044) 
             
Pop_Origin 0.752*** 0.706*** 0.777*** 0.794*** 0.748*** 0.695*** 0.778*** 0.785*** 0.753*** 0.710*** 0.767*** 0.796*** 
 (0.034) (0.045) (0.032) (0.029) (0.033) (0.043) (0.032) (0.030) (0.037) (0.047) (0.034) (0.031) 
             
Tax_Destination -0.053*** -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.054*** -0.032*** -0.017 -0.017 -0.039*** -0.063*** -0.045*** -0.046*** -0.066*** 
 (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.009) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009) 
Tax_Origin 0.020** 0.042*** 0.014 0.006 0.016* 0.034*** 0.010 0.003 0.019** 0.043*** 0.014 0.005 
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) 
             
N 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 
pseudo R2 0.056 0.059 0.060 0.071 0.058 0.062 0.064 0.071 0.059 0.063 0.063 0.076 
Wald chi2(17) 1569.982 997.107 2032.094 2671.563 1697.389 1065.431 2044.447 2659.335 1405.346 920.503 1818.795 2480.436 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log pseudolikelihood -19852.412 -16840.853 -17011.165 -17618.794 -18046.610 -15049.902 -15122.270 -15899.866 -18252.906 -15159.116 -15441.278 -16001.937 
Alpha 2.662 3.113 2.822 2.365 2.878 3.372 3.070 2.676 2.714 3.255 2.955 2.387 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Source: Own Computation. 
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Appendix 3 - Negative Binomial regression with robust standard errors, 2010 – Incidence Rate Ratio 
Independent  
Variables 
Overall  Skill Level   Female Migrants Male Migrants 
Migrants Low Medium High  All Skill Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill  All Skill Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill 
             
CPI_Destination -1.147*** -0.958*** -1.125*** -1.138*** -0.703*** -0.599*** -0.689*** -0.701*** -1.121*** -0.941*** -1.088*** -1.078*** 
 (0.118) (0.098) (0.105) (0.111) (0.091) (0.083) (0.085) (0.090) (0.115) (0.093) (0.098) (0.106) 
CPI_Origin -0.009 -0.037 -0.017 -0.058 -0.071 -0.045 -0.048 -0.086 -0.058 -0.016 -0.075 -0.121* 
 (0.078) (0.068) (0.073) (0.077) (0.072) (0.063) (0.067) (0.070) (0.074) (0.064) (0.069) (0.072) 
Colonial_Relationship -20.223*** -21.610*** -20.866*** -20.253*** -20.845*** -21.290*** -20.478*** -1.372 -20.545*** -22.209*** -21.112*** -21.877*** 
 (0.494) (0.455) (0.474) (0.523) (0.583) (0.449) (0.570) (1.127) (0.492) (0.452) (0.467) (0.568) 
             
Common_Language -1.315*** -0.897*** -0.946*** -1.327*** -1.672*** -0.904*** -1.247*** -1.827*** -1.166*** -0.281 -0.851*** -1.008*** 
 (0.375) (0.294) (0.288) (0.340) (0.346) (0.252) (0.270) (0.319) (0.349) (0.246) (0.272) (0.312) 
             
Common_Religion 0.076 -0.218 -0.297 -0.079 0.298 -0.233 -0.025 -0.069 0.031 -0.185 -0.013 -0.049 
 (0.364) (0.342) (0.346) (0.363) (0.344) (0.326) (0.329) (0.348) (0.350) (0.319) (0.317) (0.346) 
             
Contiguity 1.498* 1.747** 1.608* 1.864** 0.955 0.840 0.770 1.220 1.643* 1.438* 1.347 1.798* 
 (0.898) (0.884) (0.903) (0.942) (0.900) (0.923) (0.937) (0.954) (0.927) (0.859) (0.885) (0.961) 
             
             
             
Distance 0.936*** 1.094*** 1.038*** 1.083*** 0.858*** 1.014*** 0.944*** 1.062*** 0.997*** 1.129*** 1.029*** 1.105*** 
 (0.147) (0.147) (0.141) (0.154) (0.140) (0.133) (0.132) (0.149) (0.146) (0.139) (0.130) (0.148) 
             
GDPPC_Destination 0.363 0.216 0.437* 0.307 -0.863*** -1.046*** -0.944*** -1.239*** 0.275 -0.022 0.436* 0.270 
 (0.238) (0.225) (0.236) (0.238) (0.217) (0.205) (0.211) (0.216) (0.232) (0.210) (0.234) (0.238) 
             
GDPPC_Origin -0.549*** -0.484*** -0.621*** -0.551*** -0.567*** -0.576*** -0.690*** -0.656*** -0.519*** -0.514*** -0.573*** -0.503*** 
 (0.125) (0.111) (0.116) (0.122) (0.111) (0.100) (0.103) (0.106) (0.117) (0.102) (0.107) (0.112) 
             
Inflation_Destination -0.604*** -0.405*** -0.557*** -0.538*** 0.082 0.180 0.194 0.166 -0.625*** -0.460*** -0.443*** -0.490*** 
 (0.157) (0.146) (0.155) (0.155) (0.151) (0.140) (0.151) (0.152) (0.151) (0.137) (0.151) (0.152) 
             
Inflation_Origin -0.052* -0.051** -0.057** -0.039 -0.033 -0.044** -0.033 -0.050** -0.056** -0.041* -0.066*** -0.023 
 (0.027) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) 
             
Unemp_Destination -0.063 -0.083 -0.120* -0.063 0.007 -0.055 -0.074 -0.055 -0.057 -0.125** -0.160** -0.027 
 (0.080) (0.065) (0.068) (0.076) (0.072) (0.059) (0.060) (0.067) (0.076) (0.060) (0.063) (0.070) 
             
Unemp_Origin 0.005 0.006 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.011 -0.017 -0.006 0.015 -0.005 -0.010 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
             
Pop_Destination -0.508*** -0.411*** -0.550*** -0.558*** -0.712*** -0.621*** -0.799*** -0.779*** -0.530*** -0.409*** -0.631*** -0.646*** 
 (0.099) (0.087) (0.092) (0.100) (0.098) (0.083) (0.091) (0.098) (0.097) (0.080) (0.090) (0.098) 
             
Pop_Origin -0.691*** -0.739*** -0.773*** -0.799*** -0.706*** -0.759*** -0.778*** -0.825*** -0.740*** -0.681*** -0.783*** -0.874*** 
 (0.061) (0.055) (0.059) (0.062) (0.056) (0.052) (0.054) (0.058) (0.062) (0.049) (0.056) (0.064) 
             
Tax_Destination 0.080*** 0.057*** 0.051*** 0.068*** 0.019 -0.006 -0.026 -0.018 0.077*** 0.045*** 0.029* 0.078*** 
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.019) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) 
             
Tax_Origin -0.023* -0.020 -0.015 -0.025* -0.012 -0.009 -0.003 -0.009 -0.011 -0.008 -0.017 -0.010 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
N 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 
pseudo R2 0.056 0.059 0.060 0.071 0.058 0.062 0.064 0.071 0.059 0.063 0.063 0.076 
Wald chi2(17) 1569.982 997.107 2032.094 2671.563 1697.389 1065.431 2044.447 2659.335 1405.346 920.503 1818.795 2480.436 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log pseudolikelihood -19852.412 -16840.853 -17011.165 -17618.794 -18046.610 -15049.902 -15122.270 -15899.866 -18252.906 -15159.116 -15441.278 -16001.937 
Alpha 2.662 3.113 2.822 2.365 2.878 3.372 3.070 2.676 2.714 3.255 2.955 2.387 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Exponentiated Coefficients; Source: Own Computation. 
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Appendix 4 – Zero Inflated Poisson regression with robust standard errors, 2010 – Logit (1) 
Independent  
Variables 
Overall  Skill Level   Female Migrants Male Migrants 
Migrants Low Medium High  All Skill Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill  All Skill Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill 
             
CPI_Destination 0.318*** 0.383*** 0.325*** 0.321*** 0.495*** 0.550*** 0.502*** 0.496*** 0.326*** 0.390*** 0.337*** 0.340*** 
 (0.037) (0.038) (0.034) (0.036) (0.045) (0.046) (0.043) (0.045) (0.038) (0.036) (0.033) (0.036) 
CPI_Origin 0.991 0.964 0.983 0.944 0.932 0.956 0.953 0.918 0.944 0.984 0.927 0.886* 
 (0.077) (0.066) (0.072) (0.072) (0.067) (0.060) (0.064) (0.064) (0.070) (0.063) (0.064) (0.064) 
Colonial_Relationship 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.254 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.286) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Common_Language 0.268*** 0.408*** 0.388*** 0.265*** 0.188*** 0.405*** 0.287*** 0.161*** 0.312*** 0.755 0.427*** 0.365*** 
 (0.101) (0.120) (0.112) (0.090) (0.065) (0.102) (0.078) (0.051) (0.109) (0.186) (0.116) (0.114) 
             
Common_Religion 1.079 0.804 0.743 0.924 1.348 0.792 0.976 0.933 1.031 0.831 0.987 0.952 
 (0.393) (0.275) (0.257) (0.336) (0.464) (0.258) (0.321) (0.325) (0.361) (0.265) (0.313) (0.330) 
             
Contiguity 4.475* 5.740** 4.991* 6.452** 2.599 2.316 2.159 3.388 5.169* 4.214* 3.846 6.036* 
 (4.016) (5.074) (4.504) (6.076) (2.339) (2.138) (2.024) (3.232) (4.789) (3.621) (3.403) (5.800) 
             
             
Distance 2.549*** 2.986*** 2.825*** 2.954*** 2.358*** 2.756*** 2.569*** 2.892*** 2.711*** 3.091*** 2.797*** 3.018*** 
 (0.374) (0.440) (0.398) (0.454) (0.331) (0.367) (0.340) (0.430) (0.395) (0.429) (0.362) (0.448) 
             
GDPPC_Destination 1.438 1.241 1.547* 1.359 0.422*** 0.351*** 0.389*** 0.290*** 1.317 0.978 1.547* 1.310 
 (0.342) (0.279) (0.365) (0.323) (0.092) (0.072) (0.082) (0.063) (0.306) (0.206) (0.362) (0.311) 
             
GDPPC_Origin 0.578*** 0.617*** 0.537*** 0.576*** 0.567*** 0.562*** 0.502*** 0.519*** 0.595*** 0.598*** 0.564*** 0.605*** 
 (0.072) (0.068) (0.062) (0.070) (0.063) (0.056) (0.052) (0.055) (0.069) (0.061) (0.060) (0.068) 
             
Inflation_Destination 0.546*** 0.667*** 0.573*** 0.584*** 1.086 1.197 1.214 1.180 0.535*** 0.631*** 0.642*** 0.613*** 
 (0.086) (0.098) (0.089) (0.090) (0.164) (0.168) (0.184) (0.180) (0.081) (0.086) (0.097) (0.093) 
             
Inflation_Origin 0.950* 0.950** 0.945** 0.961 0.968 0.957** 0.968 0.951** 0.946** 0.959* 0.936*** 0.977 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) (0.021) (0.022) (0.024) 
             
Unemp_Destination 0.939 0.920 0.887* 0.939 1.007 0.946 0.928 0.947 0.945 0.882** 0.852** 0.973 
 (0.075) (0.060) (0.060) (0.071) (0.072) (0.056) (0.056) (0.064) (0.071) (0.053) (0.054) (0.068) 
             
Unemp_Origin 1.005 1.006 1.000 0.998 1.000 0.999 0.989 0.984 0.994 1.015 0.995 0.990 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
             
Pop_Destination 0.602*** 0.663*** 0.577*** 0.573*** 0.491*** 0.538*** 0.450*** 0.459*** 0.588*** 0.665*** 0.532*** 0.524*** 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.053) (0.058) (0.048) (0.045) (0.041) (0.045) (0.057) (0.053) (0.048) (0.052) 
             
Pop_Origin 0.501*** 0.478*** 0.462*** 0.450*** 0.494*** 0.468*** 0.459*** 0.438*** 0.477*** 0.506*** 0.457*** 0.417*** 
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) 
             
Tax_Destination 1.083*** 1.058*** 1.052*** 1.071*** 1.019 0.994 0.974 0.982 1.080*** 1.046*** 1.030* 1.082*** 
 (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) 
             
Tax_Origin 0.977* 0.981 0.985 0.975* 0.988 0.991 0.997 0.991 0.989 0.992 0.983 0.990 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
N 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 
N Zeroes 191 239 243 212 252 340 336 306 211 295 292 254 
Wald chi2(17) 1261.418 431.072 849.339 1956.893 1524.388 447.012 834.299 1953.643 967.371 389.504 722.711 1989.313 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log pseudolikelihood -4.065e+07 -1.789e+07 -1.352e+07 -1.280e+07 -2.024e+07 -9026728.188 -6305498.977 -6917219.140 -2.149e+07 -9170492.907 -7655741.537 -6253078.631 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Source: Own Computation. 
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Appendix 5 – Zero Inflated Poisson regression with robust standard errors, 2010 – Poisson (2) 
Independent  
Variables 
Overall  Skill Level   Female Migrants Male Migrants 
Migrants Low Medium High  All Skill Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill  All Skill Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill 
             
CPI_Destination 0.190** 0.077 0.156 0.469*** 0.191* 0.129 0.056 0.466*** 0.192** 0.023 0.238** 0.462*** 
 (0.092) (0.123) (0.096) (0.117) (0.099) (0.130) (0.103) (0.124) (0.090) (0.122) (0.100) (0.113) 
CPI_Origin -0.281*** -0.436*** -0.272*** -0.160*** -0.282*** -0.414*** -0.266*** -0.180*** -0.279*** -0.456*** -0.278*** -0.135*** 
 (0.071) (0.083) (0.078) (0.051) (0.067) (0.081) (0.074) (0.051) (0.077) (0.086) (0.086) (0.052) 
Colonial_Relationship 1.188*** 1.968*** 0.679*** 0.987*** 1.130*** 1.831*** 0.559** 0.979*** 1.247*** 2.105*** 0.792*** 1.001*** 
 (0.207) (0.359) (0.237) (0.189) (0.185) (0.339) (0.223) (0.231) (0.244) (0.383) (0.267) (0.160) 
             
Common_Language 0.512** -0.153 0.399 0.969*** 0.598*** -0.038 0.550** 0.999*** 0.413* -0.288 0.236 0.925*** 
 (0.214) (0.258) (0.245) (0.161) (0.199) (0.252) (0.218) (0.162) (0.235) (0.270) (0.288) (0.168) 
             
Common_Religion 0.643** 0.810 0.748** 0.290 0.732** 0.807 0.890*** 0.410 0.524 0.786 0.563 0.114 
 (0.320) (0.555) (0.341) (0.293) (0.316) (0.537) (0.336) (0.307) (0.337) (0.588) (0.360) (0.290) 
             
Contiguity 0.799* 1.060** 0.670 0.304 0.779* 1.103** 0.674 0.283 0.823* 1.023** 0.685 0.345 
 (0.470) (0.429) (0.456) (0.381) (0.442) (0.433) (0.418) (0.354) (0.500) (0.427) (0.499) (0.418) 
             
             
Distance -0.612*** -0.991*** -0.703*** -0.358*** -0.554*** -0.882*** -0.621*** -0.341*** -0.668*** -1.095*** -0.770*** -0.371*** 
 (0.111) (0.140) (0.132) (0.095) (0.111) (0.142) (0.130) (0.099) (0.114) (0.141) (0.139) (0.094) 
             
GDPPC_Destination 0.711** 0.254 1.049*** 0.884*** 1.135*** 0.567 1.740*** 1.097*** 0.349 -0.095 0.659* 0.566** 
 (0.284) (0.390) (0.328) (0.219) (0.261) (0.365) (0.288) (0.217) (0.326) (0.461) (0.387) (0.248) 
             
GDPPC_Origin 0.347*** 0.303*** 0.310*** 0.367*** 0.372*** 0.311*** 0.329*** 0.394*** 0.313*** 0.281** 0.281*** 0.330*** 
 (0.084) (0.110) (0.099) (0.075) (0.082) (0.108) (0.097) (0.075) (0.088) (0.115) (0.104) (0.077) 
             
Inflation_Destination 0.944*** 0.460** 1.434*** 1.133*** 0.912*** 0.421* 1.270*** 1.183*** 0.971*** 0.485** 1.580*** 1.078*** 
 (0.202) (0.233) (0.242) (0.174) (0.189) (0.223) (0.218) (0.174) (0.218) (0.244) (0.279) (0.182) 
             
Inflation_Origin -0.034 -0.056 -0.049* -0.010 -0.034 -0.051 -0.045* -0.017 -0.035 -0.063 -0.057** -0.002 
 (0.022) (0.038) (0.026) (0.021) (0.022) (0.038) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.040) (0.029) (0.020) 
             
Unemp_Destination -0.050 -0.157*** 0.021 -0.018 -0.025 -0.128** 0.047 -0.006 -0.070 -0.188*** 0.013 -0.038 
 (0.049) (0.060) (0.057) (0.041) (0.047) (0.057) (0.055) (0.042) (0.053) (0.065) (0.062) (0.044) 
             
Unemp_Origin -0.033** -0.038** -0.021 -0.038*** -0.035** -0.033* -0.028* -0.041*** -0.030** -0.043** -0.013 -0.034*** 
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.020) (0.017) (0.013) 
             
Pop_Destination 0.824*** 1.022*** 0.657*** 0.787*** 0.844*** 1.026*** 0.700*** 0.792*** 0.810*** 1.024*** 0.628*** 0.773*** 
 (0.062) (0.088) (0.057) (0.057) (0.061) (0.086) (0.058) (0.060) (0.066) (0.096) (0.062) (0.057) 
             
Pop_Origin 0.556*** 0.527*** 0.500*** 0.589*** 0.544*** 0.518*** 0.491*** 0.569*** 0.564*** 0.529*** 0.498*** 0.604*** 
 (0.033) (0.052) (0.036) (0.031) (0.032) (0.051) (0.036) (0.031) (0.035) (0.054) (0.038) (0.033) 
             
Tax_Destination -0.075*** -0.038* -0.123*** -0.096*** -0.064*** -0.029 -0.104*** -0.090*** -0.085*** -0.046** -0.138*** -0.103*** 
 (0.013) (0.020) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.022) (0.016) (0.012) 
             
Tax_Origin 0.019 0.015 0.011 0.020* 0.016 0.015 0.007 0.017 0.022* 0.015 0.015 0.024** 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012) 
N 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 2261 
Number of Zeroes 191 239 243 212 252 340 336 306 211 295 292 254 
Wald chi2(17) 1261.418 431.072 849.339 1956.893 1524.388 447.012 834.299 1953.643 967.371 389.504 722.711 1989.313 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log pseudolikelihood -4.065e+07 -1.789e+07 -1.352e+07 -1.280e+07 -2.024e+07 -9026728.188 -6305498.977 -6917219.140 -2.149e+07 -9170492.907 -7655741.537 -6253078.631 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Source: Own Computation. 
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Appendix 6 - Literature summary 
Reference Research question (Goal) Research method Sample 
Dependent 
Variables 
Main Independent Variables Main conclusion 
Ariu and 
Squicciarini 
(2013) 
To find if corruption could be an 
important factor for emigration and 
immigration decisions by highly skilled 
professionals. 
Empirical - OLS  
Net flows across 123 
countries 
Net, inflows and 
outflows of migrants 
Corruption 
Highly skilled workers are mobile, flexible and 
have a bigger tendency to migrate. Corruption has 
a negative effect (decreases) on inflows and 
positive on outflows. 
Between 1990 and 2000 GDP per Capita 
For Migration: 
 Docquier et al. (2009)  
  
For Corruption- 
International Country Risk 
Guide corruption index  
  
Dimant et al. 
(2013) 
To examine the influence of corruption 
on migration 
Empirical - pooled OLS and 
fixed effects model with 
Driscoll–Kraay standard 
errors 
111 Countries 
Skilled Migration 
Rates 
Corruption (+) Youth Burden 
Corruption is a push factor of migration, 
particularly for skilled migration. Corruption 
increases migration outflows. 
Between 1985 and 2000 Distance (-) 
Quality of 
Bureaucracy 
For Migration: 
 Skilled migration rates 
Population (-) Trade Openness (+) 
 
Regime Type 
(+) 
Former Colony (+) 
For Corruption: 
 International Country Risk 
Guide corruption index  
Political 
Instability 
GDP per Capita (- 
for Skilled and + For 
average) 
Ahmad and 
Arjumand 
(2016) 
To examine the impact of corruption on 
GDP per capita 
Empirical - pooled OLS and 
fixed effects models 
94 Countries 
Does not directly apply since migration is not the 
dependent variable.  
Corruption may drive those who do not want to 
comply with it to either leave their homelands or 
drives them to become corrupt. 
From 1996 to 2010 
For Migration- World 
Development Indicators 
For Corruption- CPI 
Poprawe (2015) 
To show the relationship between 
corruption and migration 
Empirical- Negative Binomial, 
PPML (robustness) and fixed 
effects model 
230 Countries  
 2000 and 2010  
(robustness check) 
Bilateral Migration 
Flows 
Corruption 
Home (-) 
Common Border (+) 
Countries with more corruption attract less 
immigrants and leads to more emigration. 
Unilateral Migration 
Flows (robustness 
check) 
Corruption 
Destination (+) 
Common Language 
(+) 
  Distance (-) Tertiary education 
For Migration: 
Özden et al. (2011) 
  
Population 
Home (+) 
Inflation Home (-) 
   
Population 
Destination (+) 
Inflation Destination 
(-) 
For Corruption: 
 Corruption Perception 
Index  
  
  
Tax rate 
Destination (-) 
Political System 
  
Political 
Stability 
Others 
Source: Own computation.  
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Appendix 6 - Literature summary (continuation) 
Reference Research question (Goal) Research method Sample 
Dependent 
Variables 
Main Independent Variables Main conclusion 
Ketterer and 
Rodríguez-Pose 
(2015) 
To investigate the impact of 
local quality of government on 
regional attractiveness to 
migrants  
Empirical - Fixed-effect 
instrumental variables 
techniques, 2SLS 
regressions, and an 
Arellano-Bond GMM 
254 European Regions 
 
Between 1995 and 2009 
Net 
migration 
flows 
Corruption (+) 
Lagged 
Migration (+) 
Less corruption is associated with lower levels 
of uncertainty and monetary costs. 
Unemployment 
 (-) 
Agricultural 
Share (-) 
For Migration- Eurostat 
Regio Database Quality of 
government index 
(+) 
And others 
more 
For Corruption 
(governance) - World 
Governance Indicators 
Yusuf (2012) 
To Investigate how migration 
laws and policies make the 
state potentially complicit in 
corruption 
Theoretical Model Does not apply. 
Developed countries might be providing 
opportunities for certain individuals to not 
only move illicit funds, but also privileging and 
offering them additional benefits. 
Steinberg (2017) 
To study the relationship 
between resource abundance 
and the selectivity of 
migration 
Theoretical model and 
empirical: Pooled OLS, 
Fixed and Random effects 
model. 3SLS and Dynamic 
Panel model 
116 source and 23 
destination countries. 
Does not apply as corruption is not directly 
measured. 
Natural resource shocks have a positive brain 
drain effect in a country, which is especially 
relevant in countries that are more susceptible 
to corruption and government inefficiencies. 
Between 1910 and 2009 
For Migration- A 
different study 
Issifou (2017) 
To investigate whether access 
to migration reduces the 
positive effect of natural 
resources on the onset of civil 
conflicts 
Empirical Logit, Fixed 
effects model, PPML and 
2SLS. 
226 Countries 
Does not apply as corruption is not directly 
measured. 
Migration may reduce natural resource rent 
seeking and decrease civil conflicts. 
From 1960 to 2010 
For Migration- Özden et 
al. (2011) 
Mariani (2007) 
To develop a new mechanism 
through which skilled 
migration may influence 
economic performance in 
the sending country 
Theoretical Model Does not apply. 
There should be a positive income-maximizing 
migration rate. 
 Also, inefficient allocation of talent is the 
reason of underdevelopment.  
Peng (2009) 
To study migration and rent-
seeking activities in a 
framework of heterogeneous 
ability. 
Theoretical Model Does not apply. 
Given the possibility of migration that 
increases the productive sector attractiveness, 
such will result not only in a quantitative 
movement to the productive sector but also in 
a qualitative movement. 
Source: Own computation. 
